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L introduction
Computers are now an integral part of government administration.
They put a tremendous amount of personal data in the hands of govern-
ment officials, who base a wide range of decisions on this information.
Yet the attention paid to the government's use of data processing has not
been equal to the potential dangers that this application presents. Per-
sonal information, when disclosed to family and friends, helps form the
basis of trust; in the hands of strangers, this information can have a cor-
rosive effect on individual autonomy. The human race's rapid develop-
ment of computer technology has not been matched by a requisite
growth in the ability to control these new machines.
This Article attempts to develop a jurisprudential approach to con-
trolling the use of computers to process personal data in the activist
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state.I So long as government bureaucracy relies on the technical treat-
ment of personal information, the law must pay attention to the structure
of data processing and its effects on both the individual and the social
goals of the state. This Article's perspective is shaped by the reorienta-
tion of American administrative law toward "internal" concerns of
agency management 2 and by the European development of data protec-
tion law.3 This Article's goal is to formulate a constructive response to
computer processing of personal data. The destruction of computers is
no more an answer to informatization than the destruction of earlier ma-
1. The term "activist state" refers to those activities that attempt to structure the social,
political, and physical environment. See infra text accompanying notes 35-44.
The application of computer technology in this context raises risks apart from the govern-
ment's employment of computers in processing personal data. Although examination of these
other dangers is beyond the scope of this Article, two are worthy of mention. One relates to
the impact of computers on the workplace environment. See S. 2164, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) ("[A] bill to prevent potential abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace."); OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR 1
(1987) ("There is controversy about computer-based monitoring on grounds that it invades
employees' privacy, causes stress, and can be used unfairly by employers."); Peter T. Kilborn,
Unseen Sentinels in the Workplace-A Special Report: Workers Using Computers Find 'Big
Brother' Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990, at Al. The other involves health risks associated
with electromagnetism. See INDIRA NAIR ET AL., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
U.S. CONGRESS, BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF POWER FREQUENCY: ELECTRIC AND MAGNETIC
FIELDS (1989); Paul Brodeur, Annals of Radiation: The Hazards of Electromagnetic Fields:
Video-Display Terminals, THE NEW YORKER, June 26, 1989, at 39; William K. Stevens, Scien-
tists Debate Health Hazards of Electromagnetic Fields, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1989, at Cl.
2. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 15 (1983) (hereinafter MASHAW,
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE] (describing the search for "an internal law of administration"-a
quest that seeks to structure responsibility); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and
Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983) (discussion of internal structure of
welfare administration). For an earlier example of this approach, see Joel F. Handler, Control-
ling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CAL. L. REv. 479, 501 (1966) ("An ap-
proach that looks to statutory and administrative methods of control focuses on the nature of
the causes and conditions of official behavior and then seeks ways of changing the causes and
conditions.").
3. For European definitions of data protection law and its goals, see Loi No. 78-17 du
Janvier 1978 Relative i l'Informatique, aux Fichiers et aux Libertis, J.O. 7 janvier 1978, J.O.
25 janvier 1978 (The goal of French data protection is to place "informatices" at the service of
each citizen, insure its development within a context of international cooperation, and prevent
it from damaging human identity, human rights, private life, individual rights, or private
rights.); Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Datenverarbeitung und Datenschutzes,
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) vom 20 Januar 1990, BGBI. I S.2954 (defining the role of data
protection as safeguarding the individual's "right of personality" from harm caused by the
application of personal data). See also Spiros Simitis, Einleitung, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ 60-63 (Spiros Simitis et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter Simitis, Ger-
man Data Protection Law Commentary] (Data protection safeguards specific conditions for the
existence and development of the individual in a highly technical society.).
For an insightful comparative analysis of the development of data protection law, see
DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES (1989).
chines would have been an answer to industrialization. Accordingly, this
Article seeks to understand the results of the government's processing of
personal data and to develop appropriate legal principles to guide this
application of computer technology. Meeting this goal is not beyond our
power: several Western nations have been at least partially successful in
constructing such a body of law.4 From an international perspective, the
American response appears muted and incomplete.5
In other countries, this area of legal activity is called data protection
law. This Article's constructive response to the computer is to articulate
principles of an American law of data protection. The Article begins by
examining the origins of the use of personal information by the govern-
ment. Part I describes the changing role of the government in the private
sphere of the individual. With the decline of mid-nineteenth century no-
tions of classical liberalism, the state has taken a more active role in su-
pervising the market and the family. The state's expanded role has
transformed the private domain into a social sphere of political choice
and experimentation and has obliged the state to gather increasing
amounts of personal information. Like industry, the government has
chosen to process this information in a mechanical fashion. This ap-
proach may be described as the data processing model of administrative
control. It is characterized by the rationalized handling of data as a flow
within administrative bodies that are designed to be processors of infor-
mation. These administrative organizations are set up to seek the most
efficient method of processing information. Any improvements that
make data processing more rapid, precise, and complete are believed to
bring these bureaucratic entities closer to their assigned goals.
The activist state now relies on a data processing model to carry out
its enlarged role in society. Indeed, its management of services has be-
come dependent on its extensive collection of personal information. This
administrative role has itself been shaped by the computer's capacities as
a machine. Part I examines three characteristics of the computer that
are particularly significant: Its rapid processing and storage of enormous
amounts of data; its transformation of information into a "multifunc-
4. See FLAHERTY, supra note 3 (discussing successes and failures of data protection in
the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, and Canada); Paul Schwartz, The Com-
puter in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of Informa-
tional Self-Determination, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 694-701 (1989) (discussing recent trends in
German data protection law).
5. For criticisms of the American approach from a comparative perspective, see FLA-
HERTY, supra note 3, at 302-70; Paul Schwartz, Die neuesten Entwicklungen im amerikanis-
chen Datenschutzrecht, 5 RECHT DER DATENVERARBEITUNG 153 (1989).
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tional" form; and, finally, its production of output that appears seduc-
tively precise.
Part II analyzes the dangers of this kind of government data
processing. This type of analysis requires the development of standards
with which to assess the potential and actual harms resulting from gov-
ernment data processing. After discussing weaknesses of the "privacy"
paradigm, this Article develops two related concepts: bureaucratic jus-
tice and human autonomy. Both are applied to gauge the effects of the
government's use of personal data. This analysis is developed through
case studies of the bureaucracies that distribute welfare and enforce child
support. In each of these programs, the effects of computer applications
have been significant and largely overlooked.
After examining these applications of data processing, the Article
articulates principles to guide the use of computers in these and other
government programs. Part III indicates how an American data protec-
tion law can promote bureaucratic justice and protect human autonomy.
There are three essential elements to this response: structuring transpar-
ent data processing systems; granting limited procedural and substantive
rights to the data subject; and creating independent governmental moni-
toring of data processing systems. Part III develops these essential ele-
ments of an American data protection law and discusses how they can be
implemented. This Article argues in favor of the creation of a law of
data protection that carefully structures the state's use of personal data.
I. The Data Processing Model and the Computer
The government has come to depend on a form of bureaucratic or-
ganization that this Article calls the data processing model of administra-
tive control. This model existed long before the computer, but its most
immediate roots lie in technological innovations of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The data processing model creates bureaucratic structures that are
processors of information. These organizations are encouraged to seek a
more rapid, precise, and complete method of processing information to
better enable them to achieve their objectives. But this unreflective reli-
ance on technology can have a negative effect on both the ability of bu-
reaucracies to accomplish their assigned goals and the autonomy of the
individual.
Despite the hazardous effects of this dependence on technology, any
perception that something is amiss tends merely to result in the applica-
tion of ever more sophisticated data processing systems. The computer is
an appealing device for bureaucracies that are perpetually seeking to im-
prove their means of processing knowledge. The following sections trace
the origins of the data processing model of administration and examine
how the computer functions within the context of this model.
A. The Information Society and the Data Processing Model
Information has become the basis of the American economy. 6 The
economic worth of information technology and of the work of the bu-
reaucracies that apply it now exceeds even the net value of manufactur-
ing.7 As a result, the largest single sector of the labor force in the United
States is said to be involved in "the production and distribution of kmowl-
edge." The now-common term "information society" expresses the sig-
nificance of this gathering, coordination, and analysis of data.9
The modern information society has various historical anteced-
ents. 10 Its direct origin rests in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth
century.11 During this period, the speed with which goods could be man-
ufactured and transported increased dramatically. As one historian of
technology explains, the industrial revolution, and in particular steam-
powered machines, created a "crisis of control."12 This crisis arose from
6. For an influential discussion of the importance of "knowledge production" in the
American economy, see FRIrz MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES 362-76 (1962).
7. JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECO-
NOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 22-24 (1986); cf Stephen S. Cohen & John
Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy, in COMPUTERS IN
THE HUMAN CONTEXT 97, 98 (Tom Forester ed., 1989) ("If the United States is to remain a
wealthy and powerful economy, American manufacturing must automate, not emigrate.").
8. BENIGER, supra note 7, at 22-24. For the origin of this phrase, see MACHLUP, supra
note 6.
9. See, e.g., Jiirgen Reese et al., Die Entwicklung der Informationsgesellschaft aus der
Sicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT ODER UBERWACH-
UNGSSTAAT 17, 19 (Staatskanzlei, Hessischen Landesregierung ed., 1984) ("Information soci-
ety means above all nothing other than that the majority of employed persons earn their
income in the information sector rather than the industrial sector.") (translated from original);
cf OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMPUTER-BASED NATIONAL
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 47 (1981) [hereinafter COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS] ("The more
complex a society, the more central information is to its economic activities.").
10. Lewis Mumford has written of a record of "early technical accomplishments" that
"our own age has ungratefully assimilated without even noticing." LEWIs MUMFORD, THE
MYTH OF THE MACHINE 249 (1966). See also SIGVARD STRANDH, A HISTORY OF THE
MACHINE 169-86 (1979) (discussing organization and administration in ancient cultures).
11. BENIGER, supra note 7, at 210-87. In his perceptive analysis of the industrial revolu-
tion in America, Thomas Hughes noted that the work of creating modem America was di-
vided among three types of individuals: independent inventors, industrial scientists, and
system builders. THOMAS P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF INVENTION
AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENTHUSIASM 184-87 (1989).
12. BENIGER, supra note 7, at 218-87. See also HUGHES, supra note 11, at 298-99 (dis-
cussing "crises of control" in this period); STRANDH, supra note 10, at 173-86 (tracing the
genesis and history of "control systems").
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an acute disparity between the speed with which goods could be pro-
duced and the ability to coordinate and control their production.1 3 Dur-
ing this period of crisis, various approaches to controlling new
technology were tested. Initial attempts at control involved simple meth-
ods. For example, control was sought through closer attention to the
various stages of production. 14 A perfect representative of this early pe-
riod is the ironmaster Rouncewell in Bleak House. Rouncewell explains
to the immobile Sir Leicester Dedlock: "In these busy times, when so
many great undertakings are in progress, people like myself have so
many workmen in so many places, that we are always on the flight."
1 5
Eventually, a new approach prevailed: the administrative complexi-
ties created by machinery that outpaced conventional nineteenth century
control techniques would be mastered by organizing people and con-
structing machines to process information in a mechanical fashion. This
use of information to control production was to be achieved through the
application of technology within bureaucratic structures. 16 Rather than
travel, a Rouncewell would create machines and bureaucracies to gather
and process information for him. These structures for processing infor-
mation would be based on the newest forms of industrial production.1 7
Following the approach of the assembly line, bureaucracies used
technology to standardize information and to move it through the work-
place.1 ' The data processing model treats information as a data flow
within a rationally organized stream of administrative activities. 19
13. BENIGER, supra note 7, at 218-19.
14. lId at 240.
15. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 450 (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971)
(1853). For an analysis of Dickens' observations regarding technology and developing indus-
trialism, see 2 EDGAR E. JOHNSON, CHARLES DICKENS: HIS TRAGEDY AND TRIUMPH 794-95
(1952).
Railroads, which raised "[d]ramatic problems of control," BENIGER, supra note 7, at 221,
became a particular source of worry for Dickens after he almost died in a rail disaster. 2
JOHNSON, supra at 1018-21.
16. See HUGHES, supra note 11, at 184-219, 353-442 (comparing production systems of
Henry Taylor and Henry Ford with processing of data as a flow in bureaucracies).
17. BENIGER, supra note 7, at 370-403.
18. Id. at 393-403.
19. The notion of bureaucracy as a kind of machine can be found in the work of Max
Weber. See MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFr UND GESELLSCHAFr 561 (5th ed. 1985) (describing
"bureaucratic mechanism" and asserting that it has the same superiority that machines have
over "nonmechanical kinds of production"); see also id. at 552 ("Modem administration is
based on writings (official documents), which are preserved in the original or as a copy, and on
a staff of subordinate officials and clerks of all kinds.") (translated from original). Kurt
Tucholsky, the great critic of both Weimar Germany and the Nazis, viewed state bureaucracy
in these terms:
It is a characteristic of the machine age that most people believe that they have ac-
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Although the treatment of information within bureaucracies began
before the industrial age, the modem form of the data processing model
responded to, and was shaped by, industrial revolution in the nineteenth
century. This dynamic process took place throughout the new industrial
world. James Beniger has shown that railroads in the 1850s were struc-
tured around "intelligence gathering, hierarchical communication, feed-
back, and error detection."'20 According to Beniger, the superintendent
of the Erie Railroad sought to transform his organization into a "vast
information processor" 21 which was operated by the railroad's employ-
ees. This approach involved the systematic gathering and coordination
of information to facilitate safe and profitable management of the expan-
sive railroad line. By the end of the nineteenth century, Thomas Edison
had applied industrial methods, not to run a railroad, but to administer
an enterprise devoted to the production of technological knowledge.
22
This innovative industrial organization is reflected in the nickname of
Edison's headquarters in Camden, New Jersey: the "invention
factory.
'23
The data processing model can be employed to manage information
about small groups of machines. It can also be used to control large-
scale organizations such as the Erie Railroad and the Edison Company.
It can even be applied to manage human behavior. As industrial tech-
niques were applied to more specialized services, more information relat-
ing to individuals began to be gathered. 24 Bureaucracies now use data
complished something good when they have accomplished something. As long as the
rules are fulfilled, all are satisfied. The doctor operated; the judge handed down a
judgment on the date due; the functionary reviewed the petition-they did it accord-
ing to regulations. What comes out of it is all the same to them. "That's no longer
my business. .. ." No one oversees the entire effect of the small pieces of work and
no one wants to and so the entire effect remains on one person only: on the person
who suffers the effect. The others have done their duty.
KURT TUCHOLSKY, SCHNIPSEL 25 (Mary Gerold-Tucholsky & Fritz J. Raddatz eds., 1973)
(translated from original); see also MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 26
("[tihe general decisional technique [of bureaucratic rationality] is information retrieval and
processing").
20. BENIGER, supra note 7, at 228.
21. Id. at 226-37.
22. For an excellent account of Edison's application of industrial methods, see HUGHES,
supra note 11, at 24-52.
23. Id. at 27.
24. See ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 22 (1971) ("As if spread with a
magic nutrient, information systems of every size, shape, and form have sprouted and grown
like weeds in recent years."); Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The
Challenge of New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089,
1103 (1969) ("Ever since the federal government's entry into the taxation and social-welfare
spheres, increasing quantities of information have been elicited from citizens and recorded.").
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processing to manage information about every aspect of human exist-
ence. There are records of our physical health, educational achieve-
ments, workday performances, reading habits, and use of credit.25 Data
are now gathered about every individual before birth, during life, and
after death. 26 Just as information is used to control machines, it is also
used to regulate human behavior.
B. The Service Administration and Its Need for Personal Information
The mid-nineteenth century is significant beyond its distinction as
the period when steam machines precipitated the "crisis of control" that
would eventually lead to the creation of data processing bureaucracies.
It also marks the high point of the liberal age. The evolution from this
period of classical liberalism to the establishment of American state ac-
tivism has been characterized by greater reliance on data processing.
The role of the American state during the period that begins with mid-
nineteenth century classical liberalism and ends with late twentieth cen-
tury Reaganism is characterized by the ascendency of a service establish-
ment dependent on data processing. The triumph of the service
administration is an important event in American legal history, but one
that has never been fully understood.
Let us begin by considering the limits on the state's role during the
age of classical liberalism. Classical liberalism grounded individual au-
tonomy on the market and the liberating effect of family relations. 27 To
strengthen these two foundations of individual life, the market and the
25. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 89 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (bank records "mirror not only one's finances but his interests, his debts, his way of life,
his family, and his civic commitments"); COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 78
("There appears to be a trend toward a society in which information about a person's finances,
medical and educational histories, habits as a consumer, daily movements, and communica-
tions with others through the telephone or the mail will be collected, stored in a computer,
possibly sold to others, and used in ways over which the individual may have little or no
control.").
26. See JERRY MASHAw, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 12 (1985)
[hereinafter MASHAW, DUE PROCESS] ("Administrators make decisions that affect us from
before the cradle to beyond the grave.") (emphasis in original); see also ELIZABETH KANE,
BIRTH MOTHER: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST LEGAL SURROGATE MOTHER (1988)
(discussing obstetrics as management of data relating to baby and mother); OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 15-16
(1988) (discussing federal government's current collection of information relating to reproduc-
tive health and calling for "national surveillance system" on chlamydial infection).
27. For analysis of these elements of classical liberalism, see JORGEN HABERMAS,
STRUKTURWANDEL DER OEFFENTLICHKEIT (1962); MAx HORKHEIMER, Autoritdt und
Familie, in TRADITIONELLE UND KRITISCHE THEORIE 162 (1968); Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497
(1983).
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family were sequestered in a private sphere that was to be free from pub-
lic authority.2 8 A variety of legal norms sought to guarantee the inde-
pendence of this private domain from the state. Yet the nature of these
norms also insured the oppression of those without property (the illusion
of "freedom to contract") and of women and children (the patriarchal
nature of the bourgeois family).29 The private sphere was a mixed bless-
ing. Its decline was caused by social and economic changes that forced
the state into a different role in relation to the market and the family.
The state's relation to this private sphere changed because of the
social and economic problems caused by new industrial development.
The most important changes in this relationship occurred during the
Progressive Era and the New Deal.30 The state's first interventions in the
"private" domain led to pervasive market regulation. 31 The state came
to affect familial "privacy," for example, by guaranteeing the family
some level of support, by increasing the instances of socialization outside
the family, and by regulating the exploitation and abuse of children by
their parents.32 One important example of governmental support of the
family is the federal welfare program Aid to Families with Dependent
Children. This Article will examine some of the consequences of this
28. HABERMAS, supra note 27, at 63-74; Olsen, supra note 27, at 1504-07; see MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 27 (1985) ("Compartmentalizing the home and se-
questering it from public life refined the republican concept of domestic governance.").
29. See FRANZ NEUMAN, DEMOKRATISCHEN UND AUTORIT.REN STAAT 31 (Herbert
Marcuse ed., 1967) ("The liberal state was always as strong as required by the political and
social situation and by the Buerger's interest.") (translated from original); HORKHEIMER,
supra note 27, at 211-13 (seemingly natural characteristics of the father that gave him power
within the family were his economic position and his physical strength-with a legal backing
given to both characteristics); cf Karl E. Klare, The Public/Pivate Distinction in Labor Law,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1417 (1982) ("The core ideological function served by the public!
private distinction is to deny that the practices comprising the private sphere of life-the
worlds of business, education and culture, the community, and the family-are inextricably
linked to and at least partially constituted by politics and law.... The primary effect of the
public/private distinction is thus to inhibit the perception that the institutions in which we live
are the product of human design and can therefore be changed.").
30. MARTIN KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND Eco-
NOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA 1900-1933 (1990); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics!
Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 488-515 (1989).
31. One example of such regulation of the market is found in labor law. See, ag., KIare,
supra note 29, at 1363 (discussing perception that because the "private employment relation-
ship is affected with a public interest," states should limit discharge of employees at will). For
a historical analysis of the state's regulation of the market, see Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regu-
lation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1197-1208, 1216-29 (1986).
32. HABERMAS, supra note 27, at 188-90. For a historical analysis of American social
policy regarding family violence, see ELIZABETH PECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY (1987). For a
historical analysis of the movement against child labor, see ROBERT MNOOKIN & D. KELLY
WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 823-50 (2d ed. 1989).
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program in Part II.B. The state's role in the socialization of children has
gained in significance since the mandating of universal, compulsory
school attendance. The importance of this socialization is demonstrated,
in part, by the opposition to this state activity by those parents who wish
to educate their children at home.
33
The state's supervision of market and family has transformed the
private domain into a social sphere of political choice and experimenta-
tion.34 Even the eight years of the Reagan presidency did not restore the
original independence of the private domain. In fact, this period saw a
renewed governmental reliance on administration through data process-
ing. To understand this continuing reliance on data processing, one must
grasp the extent to which some kind of activist state survived Reagan's
presidency. Ironically, one of the best accounts of this survival has been
provided by a firm opponent of governmental activism. In The Triumph
of Politics, David Stockman, President Reagan's antistatist budget direc-
tor, recounts devising a multiple-choice budget cutting quiz to help focus
the attention of America's chief executive officer.35 President Reagan
took the quiz several times, appeared to enjoy it immensely, and yet
proved entirely unwilling to make the deep cuts that would match his
antigovernment rhetoric-or balance the federal budget.36 After noting
an American reluctance to acknowledge "the modern tradition of social
democracy," Stockman sheepishly admits the desire of the American
electorate for state activity that will "shield it from capitalism's rougher
edges."37 Reagan did assault and modify aspects of the activist state, but
he did not inter it.38 Moreover, both the maintenance of state activism
33. The Supreme Court has created a limited religious exception to compulsory school
attendance for Amish children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (Amish
parents believed that required attendance at schools until age 16 would place "Amish children
in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increased emphasis on competition in class
work and sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer
group.").
34. Habermas speaks of the family as located within a sphere of "seeming privacy"
[Scheinprivatheit] that should be seen as a "re-politicized social sphere." HABERMAS, supra
note 27, at 190, 195 (translated from original). See Olsen, supra note 27, at 1517-20 (analyzing
techniques of state regulation of the family).
35. DAVID STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE REA-
GAN REVOLUTION 386-407 (1987).
36. Id. at 386-407, 429-46. For discussion of the roots of Reagan's opposition to the
New Deal and governmental activism, see GARRY WILLS, REAGAN'S AMERICA 283-88, 357
(1987).
37. STOCKMAN, supra note 35, at 425, 428. Stockman adds, "The half-trillion-dollar
budget which remains in 1986... is there because the rank and file of GOP politicians want it
for their constituents no less than the Democrats do." Id. at 435.
38. See THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE
STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 31 (1990) (American "insurance/oppor-
and Reagan's assault on supposedly unnecessary government programs
ultimately required the same thing: information processing by the state.
This point requires elaboration.
The American state now wavers between adopting a reactive and a
preventive role.39 But when the individual's pursuit of happiness de-
pends on governmental maintenance of the social, political, and physical
environment, the government must gather more and more information
from within the boundaries of the supposedly private sphere. Compared
to its historic role, the state today depends upon the availability of vast
quantities of information,40 and much of the data it now collects relates
to identifiable individuals. Indeed, the fulfillment of many governmental
objectives depends on the gathering of such personal information.
The state gathers information because distribution of social services
is impossible without detailed information on the citizen as client, cus-
tomer, or simply person to be controlled. Moreover, the state gathers
personal information to better manage itself. Indeed, this is an area
where the Reagan revolution led to more government, not less. The Rea-
gan administration's determination to improve the management of fed-
eral programs led to dramatic increases in the use of computer
technology to process personal data. Part II of this Article examines two
tunity" state insures against impoverishment due to loss of salary and offers help to those who
have been denied opportunity).
39. For discussions of these roles of the state, see BRUCE A. ACKERmAN, RECONSTRUCT-
ING AMERICAN LAw 1-6 (1984); Rabin, supra note 31, at 1189, 1315-26. Erhard Denninger's
contribution to this debate is the concept of a "prevention state." Erhard Denninger, Der
Prdventions-Staat, 21 KRmTSCHE JUSTIZ 1 (1988).
In the United States, the notion of a preventive role for the state has never been fully
accepted. This refusal is reflected, for example, in certain limits of the Supreme Court's con-
cept of Due Process. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 196-97 (1989) ("[I]f the Due Process Clause does not require the state to provide its
citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under
the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.") with id. at
208, 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Wisconsin law invites-indeed, directs--citizens and other
governmental entities to depend on local departments of social services"; therefore, the State's
inaction may lead to liability) and Baltimore Dep't Social Servs. v. Boulmight, 493 U.S. 549,
558-59 (1990) (child found to be in need of state assistance becomes the "particular object of
the State's regulatory interests"; thus, parent cannot invoke Fifth Amendment privilege to
resist order to produce child). See David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and
Private Wrongs, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 53, 59 (criticizing reliance on distinction between govern-
mental action and inaction); Amy Sinden, Note, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward Chil-
dren Under a Post-DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1990).
40. See, e.g., PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN IN-
FORMATION SOCIETY 4 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY STUDY REPORT] ("Today, government
regulates and supports large areas of economic and social life through some of the nation's
largest bureaucratic organizations, many of which deal directly with individuals."); supra text
accompanying note 25.
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government programs in which such concerns with accuracy and effi-
ciency have intensified the application of data processing.41 The state's
role in distributing benefits and managing administration is aptly ex-
pressed in a term borrowed from German law: the service administra-
tion (Leistungsverwaltung).42 The necessary accompaniment to state
activity is a service administration that carries out legislative policy, acts
in a just manner, and combats fraud.43 In both Germany and America,
service administrations carry out these functions by processing personal
information. 44
The state, like industry, has come to rely on the data processing
model of bureaucracy. It has constructed administrative structures that
treat information as flows of data within a rationally organized stream of
activities. These organizations move information through themselves as
part of their search for the most effective means of decisionmaking. Sta-
tistics illustrate the significance of federal information use. The federal
government utilizes the world's largest collection of computers-over
13,000 medium and large computers and over 600,000 microcom-
41. See infra Parts II.B-C.
42. See Ingo von Munch, Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht in demokratischen und sozi-
alen Rechtsstaat, in ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 1, 24-28 (Hans U. Erichsen &
Wolfgang Martens eds., 8th ed. 1988) (discussing concept of "service administration"); Chris-
topher Degenhart, Die Bewditigung der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Entwicklungen
durch das Verwaltungsrecht, 1989 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2435 (discussing role
of administrative law in managing scientific and technical developments). For an American
approach to this aspect of administration, see MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note
2, at 226 ("We need to be able to think somehow of a 'right' to good administration, without
thinking merely of a transformation in the style of litigation. Such a 'right' would have to be
'enforced' through a mechanism that promised technical competence plus the comfort of legiti-
mating symbolism.") (footnotes omitted); Roscoe Pound, The Role of Law and the Modern
Social Welfare State, 7 VAND. L. REv. 1, 1 (1953) (arguing for use of term "service state"
rather than "welfare state").
43. Cf. von Munch, supra note 42, at 24-26 (administrative distribution of subventions
requires parliamentary legitimation and publication of guiding rules).
44. See, eg., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250-51 & nn.4-5 (1983) ("putative father
registry" maintained by New York in connection with administration of adoption); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979) ("[With the expanding sphere of governmental
regulation and enterprise, much of the information within government files has been submitted
by private entities seeking government contracts or responding to unconditional reporting obli-
gations imposed by law."); Green v. Philbrook, 576 F.2d 440, 445 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing
role of social security numbers in "efficient and economical" information processing in federal
assistance programs); 15,844 Welfare Recipients v. King, 474 F. Supp. 1374, 1382-90 (D.
Mass. 1979) (discussing information processing in Massachusetts welfare administration);
BUNDESBEAUFTRAGTEN FOR DEN DATENSCHUTZ, NEUNTER TATIGKEITSBERICHT [NINTH
REPORT OF ACTIvrIEs OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER] 8-
10 (1987) (listing governmental bureaucracies that process personal information in Germany
and federal laws that regulate this activity).
puters. 45 Federal expenditures for information technology have grown
by fifty percent in the last six years.46 The federal government now
spends more than $17 billion per year for information technology; this
sum represents almost two percent of the federal budget.47 The intensity
of the federal government's reliance on administration through data
processing is best indicated by the large number of its computers that are
equipped with communication links to other government computers. In
fact, the federal government leads all sectors of American industry or
trade in the percentage of its computers equipped with such communica-
tion links.
48
The dynamics of the state require an achievement-oriented service
administration that depends on information processing. The challenge is
to structure the state's activity and its administration in a fashion consis-
tent with human worth. This Article responds to that challenge not by
proposing to abolish data processing, but by seeking to comprehend the
results of its current application and develop legal principles to shape the
values of bureaucracy and its work. Carrying out the first part of this
task-understanding data processing-requires some consideration of
the capacities of the computer.
C. Capabilities of the Computer as Machine
In the past, the data processing model functioned without the use of
computers. Information was processed using other devices.49 Even
without the technical assistance of computers, bureaucratic organizations
managed enormous tasks-for both good and bad purposes. 50 Neverthe-
less, the computer is a perfect tool to implement the data processing
model, and a powerful device for a world that seeks to process knowledge
in an industrial fashion. At the same time, the use of computers alters
45. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1989, at 72 (1989).
46. Id.
47. Id.; see DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: IS YOUR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE
PUBLIC EYE? 81 (1989) ("largest inventory of computers of any single organization in the
world" belongs to the federal government).
48. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 952 (1990).
49. See BENIGER, supra note 7, at 408-22 (discussing governmental information process-
ing systems at the turn of the century). An excellent display of some of these early machines is
on permanent exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of American History ("The
Information Age," Washington, D.C.).
50. See, e.g., MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 194
(1988) (Census Bureau participated in Japanese internment program "by providing detailed
hand tabulations" and by preparing "detailed counts of the Japanese for small geographic
areas").
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the data processing model by increasing its ability to direct human be-
havior and influence the decisionmaking process. Indeed, the computer
contributes to the alienation of data processing from its original purpose
of serving human concerns. Characteristics of the computer shape the
way that individuals are handled and power is allocated in our country.
This tool is not a neutral device, but no machine is. Such devices alter
our relationship to the world and change the way we perceive it.51
The digital computer is an electronic calculating machine that relies
on binary numbers and divides its functions among a processing and
memory unit.52 The attractiveness of this tool for the data processing
model is attributable to its qualities as a machine. Three characteristics
of the computer are particularly significant in this context. The first is
the computer's capacity for rapid processing and storage of enormous
amounts of data. The second is its capacity to transform information
into a "multifunctional" form. The third is its capacity to produce "out-
put" that appears seductively precise.
(1) Rapid Processing of Enormous Data Banks
The computer's remarkable ability to process and store vast quanti-
ties of information results from combining binary math with extraordi-
nary advances in the design of circuits, software, and magnetic storage
devices.53 These developments have led to exponential increases in the
computer's ability to manipulate and store strings of binary numbers.
54
51. See JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM
JUDGMENT TO CALCULATION 17-25 (1976); GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH
LAW 347 (1990) (medical technology changes "not only the way we think about medicine, but
how we think about ourselves"); STRANDH, supra note 10, at 7-32 (discussing early tools and
their use and impact in early civilizations).
52. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 51, at 73-96. For a concise illustrated guide to the com-
puter, see DAVID MACAULAY, How MACHINES WORK 30-46 (1988).
53. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 51, at 73-110. For more on developments in computer
design, see BENIGER, supra note 7, at 399-425; JOEL SHURKIN, ENGINES OF THE MIND
(1984), STRANDH, supra note 10, at 187-202. See also Laurence Hooper & Jacob M. Schles-
inger, Speed of Light: Is Optical Computing the Next Frontier, or Just a Nutty Idea?, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 30, 1990, at Al (Bell Laboratories trying to develop a computer that uses photons
rather than electrons to make calculations); John Markoff, Silicon Valley's Design Renaissance,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1989, § 3 (Business) at 1 (discussing recent improvements in software and
chip design); John Markoff, A New Way to Speed Computers, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1989, at
D6 (describing application of hardware or software to achieve "parallel processing," the link-
ing together of central processing units); John Markoff, The P. C. 's Broad New Potential, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1988, at D1 (computer companies "have introduced high-capacity erasable
magneto-optical drives that store 12 to 50 times the amount of information currently packed
on magnetic hard disk drives").
54. See MILLER, supra note 24, at I I ("Perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the elec-
tronic age has been the rate at which technology has evolved.").
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Such increases in computer power have encouraged, in turn, the mechan-
ical management of larger and more complex forms of social activity.55
The computer's enormous ability to process information has led to
its use in the administration of welfare and child support enforcement
programs and has reinforced the strength of the data processing model in
these bureaucracies. 56 Not only does the state now use the computer to
manage activities that were once considered to be in the "private" sphere,
it also encourages non-governmental actors to adopt similar applications
of this device.57 Recent trends in the practice of medicine provide an
example of this intertwining of public and private domains.
Through Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs, the federal gov-
ernment has assumed an important role in financing health care in the
United States.58 In addition to furnishing benefits, the government has
created an administrative structure to review how government-financed
health care services are performed.5 9 In programs such as Medicare and
55. Cf WEIZENBAUM, supra note 51, at 30-31 ("[Ihe very erection of an enormously
large and complex computer based welfare administration apparatus, however, created an in-
terest in its maintenance and therefore in the perpetuation of the welfare system itself.").
56. See infra Parts II.B-C.
57. This "encouragement" is often provided through paperwork requirements that the
state imposes. Consider the likely effects of data collection requirements imposed in the regu-
lation of occupational safety and health. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1) (1988) (requiring employ-
ers to keep such records as prescribed by the Secretary of Labor or of Health and Human
Services, in order to develop "information regarding the causes and prevention of occupational
accidents and illnesses"). The state has attempted both to reduce informational demands on
the private sector, see, e.g., The Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988),
and to insure "adequate" data gathering, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2(a), 46 Fed. Reg.
13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) ("Administrative decisions shall be based on
adequate information .... ").
58. See ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: ADIERICAN HOSPITALS IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 321 (1989) ("Through the fiscal incentives and controls of Medi-
care, the federal government has become an overt and forceful arbiter of hospital service reim-
bursement."); ANNAS ET AL., supra note 51, at 121-206 ("[B]y the mid-1980s, Medicaid and
Medicare, financing health care for one out of five Americans, and representing three-quarters
of all public spending for health care, have become the primary vehicles for government health
care policy and a source of continuing controversy over their adequacy, impact and cost.").
59. See, e.g., David C. Hsia et al., Accuracy of Diagnostic Coding for Medicare Patients
Under the Prospective-Payment System, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 352 (1989) (discussing data
processing requirements of prospective payment system overseen by Department of Health
and Human Services). Aspects of the administration of Medicaid and Medicare provisions
have been challenged on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,
605 (1984) (upholding constitutionality of provisions of Medicare Act making judicial review
of claims available only after Secretary of Health and Human Services renders "final decision"
on claim); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311-27 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of Hyde
amendment to Medicaid Act, which places limitations on public funding for abortion);
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 785 (1980) (upholding constitutionality
of Medicaid provisions that give recipients the right to choose nursing home services only from
"qualified providers") (emphasis in original).
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Medicaid, the underlying services are dispensed not by government bu-
reaucrats, but by the medical profession. This body of experts tradition-
ally has been allowed to police itself and to make discrete decisions
regarding each case through the individual application of group norms.6°
In spite of this tradition of deference, the state has seized upon the com-
puter's ability to process large banks of data as a way to control doc-
tors, 61 regulate national health expenditures, 62 and help doctors control
patients.63 Private health plans and hospitals also utilize computers in
order to strengthen administrative control.64
60. See ANNAS ET AL., supra note 51, at 377 (primary role traditionally granted to medi-
cal profession in defining and enforcing "quality of care"); JAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT 30-47 (1986) (describing the success of physicians in gaining control
over medical care and freedom from lay control).
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131(b)-11152 (1988) (establishing a national data bank of medical
malpractice information); STEVENS, supra note 58, at 341 ("clinical records in hospitals are
now monitored on a routine basis, analyzing physician practice patterns"); Mark A. Hall,
Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 478 (1988) (favoring treatment protocols, whether written or
computerized).
62. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 51, at 125; Hall, supra note 61, at 478-79.
63. Jay Katz has called for patients and doctors to "talk more with one another," for
patients and doctors to acknowledge uncertainty, and for patients to be "trusted to participate
more fully in the decisions that affect their well-being." KATZ, supra note 60, at 165-206, 229.
The use of computers to assist medical decisionmaking, see infra text accompanying notes 65-
70, provides doctors a new basis upon which to reassert their authority and demand unques-
tioning obedience. This point has been explored in Don DeLillo's novel, WHITE NOISE (1985).
Consider this discussion between a doctor and the protagonist:
"People tend to forget they are patients. Once they leave the doctor's office or
the hospital, they simply put it out of their minds. But you are all permanent pa-
tients, like it or not. I am the doctor, you the patient. Doctor doesn't cease being
doctor at close of day. Neither should patient. People expect doctor to go about
things with the utmost seriousness, skill and experience. But what about patient?
How professional is he?"
He did not look up from the printout as he said these things in his meticulous
singsong.
"I don't think I like your potassium very much at all," he went on. "Look here.
A bracketed number with computerized stars."
"What does that mean?"
"There's no point your knowing at this stage."
"How was my potassium last time?"
"Quite average in fact. But perhaps this is a false elevation. We are dealing
with whole blood. There is the question of a gel barrier. Do you know what this
means?"
"No.,'
"There isn't time to explain. We have true elevation and false elevations. This
is all you have to know."
Id. at 260.
64. STEVENS, supra note 58, at 323.
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The computer may be the last best hope to control health care in a
rational way. It renders the enormous amounts of information involved
in diagnosing, treating, and billing patients accessible to external review.
Moreover, all kinds of medical decisions are now being assisted through
manipulation of "objective" patient data by the computer. Diagnosis re-
lated groups, 65 drug utilization review, 66 and treatment protocols67 are
examples of the ways in which medical practices are being standardized
with the help of the computer.68 Although intended to limit costs and
help physicians make correct treatment decisions, such computer-driven
standardization has potential drawbacks. It is capable of discouraging
communication with patients and of encouraging "cookbook"
medicine.69 More generally, the application of computers in medicine
65. A diagnosis related group is a price control "based on a packaging of all hospital
charges into one figure determined by the average cost of treating patients who have the same
diagnosis." CHARLES J. DOUGHERTY, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: REALITIES, RIGHTS, AND
REFORMS 149 (1988) (footnote omitted). It is the opposite of "fee-for-service medicine." Id,
66. "Drug utilization review" employs computers with programs that spot "disease
markers," which are drugs or combinations of drugs that tend to be used to treat a specific
disease. ROBERT F. MARONDE, DRUG UTILIZATION REVIEW WrrH ON-LINE COMPUTER
CAPABILITY (1973). These computers generate lists of medication that are potentially inap-
propriate for treatment of the disease. A clinically trained person reviews the original pre-
scription, the computer's speculation as to the diagnosis, and the computer's prediction as to
the inappropriateness of the medication. If this review confirms the existence of a conflict, the
prescription is sent back to the prescribing physician. Id. at 45-48.
67. Treatment protocols are computer-generated checklists that set "baseline[s] to which
physicians must refer in formulating their treatment plan." Hall, supra note 61, at 479.
68. Medical practices are standardized to reduce costs, to increase the benefits of treat-
ment, and to avoid mistakes. The importance of these goals cannot be doubted. See, eg.,
Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 377 (1991) ("errors in medical practice are common" and hospitals need to carry out
"quality-assurance activities"). The difficult choices arise in deriving and applying standards.
See generally DELILLO, supra note 63, at 141 (medical diagnosis after toxic disaster by doctor
who relies upon computer: "This doesn't mean anything is going to happen to you as such, at
least not today or tomorrow. It just means you are the sum total of your data."); Timothy
Egan, Oregon Lists Illnesses by Priority to See Who Gets Medicaid Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1990, at Al (State of Oregon to use computer lists to limit medical treatments for patients
whose health care is paid for by the government; lists are to take into account the "cost of
treatment, [the] estimated period in years that a patient would benefit, and the 'quality of well-
being' after treatment.").
69. See, eg., STEVENS, supra note 58, at 325 ("Hospital administrators and assorted fi-
nancial and computer-software experts" first analyze diagnosis-related groups and then en-
courage physicians to choose one diagnosis rather than another to increase payments to
hospital); Paul M. Ellwood, Shattuck Lecture-Outcomes Management, 318 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1549, 1553 (1988) ("A system of appropriate medical standards, guidelines, and hard-
and-fast rules that can be used by physicians in caring for their patients-referred to by many
physicians as 'cookbook medicine'-continues to be devastatingly controversial, providing a
bonanza for litigators, a conundrum when patients do not fit the standards, a bureaucrat's
paradise, and the last stand for free physicians."). See generally Alexander M. Capron, Con-
taining Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying
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illustrates how the computer's ability to process information encourages
and strengthens technical management and technical supervision of com-
plex social activities. This technical approach has blurred the distinction
between the public and private spheres: the state requires certain kinds
of information for use in the private sphere, and data in both spheres are
now shared and linked.
70
(2) Multifunctionality
A second important quality of the computer is its ability to make
multifunctional the information that it processes. 71 A computer can op-
erate only if humans have presented it with digital data and digital in-
structions. Transforming our world into binary code requires various
human decisions, but once personal information is in this form, the com-
puter can efficiently compare it and combine it with other digital data.
72
The computer changes personal information into a fluid form, which al-
lows it to be applied at many stages of administrative decisionmaking.
Multifunctionality profoundly changes administration. In his clas-
sic work, Legitimation through Process, Niklas Luhmann identified a
concept that he called "fragmentation of contact" (Kontaktzersplit-
terung).73 Luhmann applied this term to an important aspect of complex
administrative bodies:
Typical for administrative bodies, which are based on large bureaucra-
cies, a division of labor, and strongly differentiated management, . . . is
that contact between citizens and certain public officials comes about
only sporadically, without repeating itself in the near future and with-
out solidifying itself into a system that can embrace distinct
procedures. 74
Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708, 759 (1986) ("[O]bjectives of cost-containment pro-
grams must themselves be evaluated from an ethical perspective.").
70. See STEVENS, supra note 58, at 329-30 ("Coalitions of employers are now using data
collected by third party insurers, as well as Medicare and Medicaid, to review hospital admis-
sion and treatment patterns among their covered employees.").
71. MILLER, supra note 24, at 202; SPIRos SiMITIS, Les Garanties Generales Quant d la
Qualitd des Donndes d Caractire Personnel Faisant L'Objet d'un Traitement Automatisj in
INFORMATIQUE ET DROIT EN EUROPE 305, 306 (1986).
72. MILLER, supra note 24, at 202 ("Computers facilitate the composition of lists of peo-
ple connected with various types of activities and institutions from widely scattered data that
probably could not be brought together manually, enabling previously unknown relationships
to be revealed or inferred from seemingly disparate information."); see United States Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762-68 (1989) (computer-
ized federal rap sheet puts an end to "practical obscurity" of scattered bits of public records
located throughout the country).
73. NIKLAs LUHMANN, LEGITIMATION DURCH VERFAHREN 80 (1969).
74. Id. (translated from original).
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Due to the multifunctionality of computer data, Luhmann's observation
is no longer true: contact between the citizen and the state now occurs
constantly within a dense system of bureaucratic control managed by the
computer.
75
Data matching is an example of this constant, repetitious control.
Data matching is the electronic comparison of two or more sets of
records to find individuals included in more than one data base.76 The
federal government now carries out data matching on billions of records;
one survey of only a small portion of federal matching programs found
data exchanges in one five-year period involving seven billion records. 7
7
Some single matches have been carried out on as many as fifteen million
records.78 Moreover, data matching programs draw on information
from private parties, such as employers.79 The government even intends
to execute matches for various benefit programs to produce statistical
inferences about the suitable level of scrutiny for applicants from differ-
ent geographical areas.s0 Multifunctionality means that data can easily
be shared within the government or between the government and organi-
zations in the private sector.
By making personal information fluid, that is, capable of being read-
ily shared and combined, the computer stimulates additional interaction
between citizen and state. It also further blurs the distinction between
public and private spheres. This regularization of contact and wide shar-
ing of data prevents any abstract, noncontextual evaluation of the impact
of disclosing a given piece of personal data."' A legal distinction has
often been made between personal and sensitive information: the former
75. See the descriptions of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Child Support
Enforcement, infra Parts II.B-C.
76. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ELECTRONIC RECORD SYS-
TEMS AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 38 (1986) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS].
77. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, THE COMPUTER MATCHING AND PRI-
VACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988).
78. ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS, supra note 76, at 53.
79. See the description of data matching in the Child Support Enforcement Program,
infra Part II.C.
80. See Office of Management & Budget, Final Guidance Interpreting the Provisions of
Public Law 100-503, Computer Matching and Privacy Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,818,
25,821 (1989) ("a continuing matching program that shows one geographical area consistently
experiencing a higher default rate than others may result in more rigorous scrutiny of appli-
cants from that area").
81. See MILLER, supra note 24, at 34 ("Even data that are characterized as 'hard' or
'factual' often take on different shades of meaning in different contexts."); Spiros Simitis, Re-
viewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 709 (1987) [hereinafter
Simitis, Reviewing Privacy] ("The boundary between a permissible exchange of facts about
people, necessary to avoid misrepresentation, and an impermissible intrusion and surveillance
... [depends] on the particular purposes of each data collection as well as on the mode of the
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merely refers to a specific person; the latter identifies aspects of a person's
life that are intimate and therefore more deserving of legal protection.
82
Legal protection based on the sensitivity of personal data is irrelevant,
however, when a computer is utilized. The impact of bureaucratic appli-
cation of information, whether merely personal or also sensitive, now de-
pends upon the means of processing, the kinds of data bases to be shared,
and the ends to which the processed data will be put. If any of these
factors change, so will the impact on the concerned party.
(3) Seductive Precision of Output
The final quality of the computer that shapes the social impact of its
use is the seductive precision of its answers. The computer's output-the
answers that it gives-is easily accepted as the whole of reality because
many people believe that this machine offers a solution to the fatal dual-
ity of mind and body. In this view, human reason is limited by human
passion, but the computer overcomes this limitation by making cognitive
analysis available without the obscuring effect of the corporeal.83 An ad-
vertisement for one computer manufacturer tries to soften this notion by
information process and the potential implications of the data use for the person under
scrutiny.").
82. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (telephone numbers a per-
son dials are "routinely used by telephone companies" and are not subject to constitutional
protection) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) ("checks are not confidential
communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions" and are
not subject to constitutional protection) and Cantor v. Supreme Court, 353 F. Supp. 1307,
1321 (E.D. Pa.) (upholding state disciplinary rule requiring attorneys to file their Social Secur-
ity numbers as part of required statement upon payment of annual dues: "[I]t is impossible...
to perceive how requiring a Social Security Number either threatens the future of Western
civilization or deprives lawyers of basic individual dignity, and certainly it does not rise to a
breach of any federal constitutional rights."), affTd, 487 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1973) with United
States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989)
(protecting police rap sheet from public disclosure on privacy grounds) and Department of the
Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 382, 383-84 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (material in
records of Air Force Academy pertaining to honor and ethics hearing is highly sensitive and
worthy of great protection from disclosure) and New York Times v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002,
1004-05 & n.1, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane) ("voice inflections" of Challenger astro-
nauts are "personal" and meet threshold test for "privacy" exemption of Freedom of Informa-
tion Act) and National Ass'n of Retired Federal Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 879
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (significant interest in fact of annuitant status). See generally Spiros Simitis,
"Sensitive Daten"--Zur Geschichte und Wirkung einer Fiktion, in FEsrsCHRIFT ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG VON MARIO M. PEDRAZZINI 469 (1990) (discussing the "fiction" of the notion
of "sensitive data").
83. For discussion and criticism of this belief, see LEWis MUMFORD, THE PENTAGON OF
POWER 273 (1970) [hereinafter MUMFORD, THE PENTAGON OF POWER] and John R. Searle,
Letter to the Editors, N.Y. REV. BooKs, June 14, 1990, at 58.
showing a computer's display screen with eyes and a smile.8 4 But
whether we conceive of the computer as inhumanly rational or attribute
some humanity to it, this machine can do no more than apply effective
procedures within a digital environment.
An effective procedure is a set of rules that states all the operations
to be executed at all tim.es.85 To write such commands, a programmer
must also express assumptions that underlie his or her base of knowl-
edge. But, as Joseph Weizenbaum has observed, the relationship be-
tween understanding and an expression of this understanding is as
problematic for a computer programmer as it is for any writer.8 6 We-
izenbaum notes: "It is in fact very hard to explain anything in terms of a
primitive vocabulary that has nothing whatsoever to do with that which
has to be explained. Yet that is precisely what most programs attempt to
do."' 87 Indeed, the computer makes this relationship even more problem-
atic by creating new ways to conceal ignorance and subjectivity.
This concealment can occur through the programmer's expression,
in digital form, of the instructions and assumptions required by the com-
puter.88 It may also occur when different teams of programmers patch
together complex systems of software at different times. When such sys-
tems are finally put into place, no one individual may understand how
they work or be able to predict the effect of malfunctions. 9 Neverthe-
less, the answers given by such complex systems appear to be extremely
accurate.
The seductive precision of the computer results from the difference
between the power that we attribute to it and its actual capacities and
limitations. 90 This disparity causes an overestimation of the computer's
84. The advertisement is for IBM's PS/2 and ran in German magazines. See, eg., DER
SPIEGEL, Sept. 11, 1989, at 128-29.
85. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 51, at 63-64.
86. Id. at 67-72, 102-110.
87. Id. at 109.
88. Thus, the seductive precision of the computer leads one to forget that "it is the
human brain that invented this ... instrument and that must feed it with the data and pose the
problems that are to be solved." MUMFORD, THE PENTAGON OF POWER, supra note 83, at
273.
89. See WEIZENBAUM, supra note 51, at 236-38; JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, K URS AUF DEN
EISBERG 93 (1988); cf HUGHES, supra note 11, at 463 (discussing "multiple interactive fail-
ures" in "tightly coupled systems"). Fear of these kinds of mass system failures led the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany to create the Federal Bureau for Security in Information
Technology in 1990. See Johann Bizer & Alexander Rolinagel, Sicherheit in der Information-
stechnik-Aufgabeftir ein neues Bundesamt, 23 KRITISCHE JUSTIz 436 (1990).
90. Under the rubric of "informatics as oracle," the French National Commission of
Informatics and Liberties recently made reference to this belief in the computer's seductive
precision:
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accuracy and applicability. It encourages the belief that disparate social
activities are capable of pure technical management, and discourages ex-
amination of incongruencies between technical management and the ac-
tual goals of the social service. This Article examines examples of this
incongruence in Parts II and III: the exclusion of potential clients from
welfare because of an increase in data and documentation requirements
for program eligibility;91 the possible termination of noncustodial par-
ents' employment because of wage withholding orders;92 and the creation
by government agencies of processing systems that are so intricate the
legislative branch may be incapable of understanding them.93
When combined with the computer's capability for rapid treatment
of large amounts of data and its transformation of information into mul-
tifunctional form, the seductive precision of the computer's output en-
courages the bureaucratic processing of information and heightens its
impact. Once personal information is in digital form, the computer offers
the state and society a powerful way to control the behavior of individu-
als. The next part of this Article presents two case studies that demon-
strate the computer's ability to establish such control.
II. The Danger to Bureaucratic Justice and Autonomy
This part examines two government programs: Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Child Support Enforcement
(CSE). These programs exemplify governmental activities in the for-
merly "private" sphere, and both depend on data processing for their
administration. Understanding and assessing the impact of data process-
ing in these contexts requires a paradigm by which to measure govern-
ment administration and human behavior; a paradigm provides a way of
seeing, a guide for arranging and giving meaning to experience. 94 To
understand the impact of data processing technology, this Article first
discusses the limitations of the paradigm of "privacy," an idea upon
which American data protection law now depends, and then develops
The human decisionmaker can, in effect, abdicate his responsibilities before these
machines that utilize prodigious forces of calculation and that rely on ever more
complex and refined software. With such tools, more so than on his own judgment,
he can rely on the computer's results by attributing a decisive importance to them.
COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTfES, 10E RAPPORT
D'ACTIVrrf 20-21 (1989) (translated from original).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 159-180.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 249-250, 312-315, 319.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 286-293.
94. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-11 (2d ed.
1970).
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two principles, bureaucratic justice and human autonomy, that will
frame the discussion of these programs. The question is not whether one
is in favor of more privacy or less. Rather, the attempt to conceptualize
the threat of the service administration's application of the computer in
terms of the paradigm of privacy is misplaced.
A. Possible Paradigms
(1) Privacy
Paradigms concerning privacy have provided a way to organize cer-
tain areas of law. With mixed success, they have been used in such fields
as family law, 95 abortion law,96 and tort law.97 But the concept of pri-
vacy consists of at least two elements that complicate its use in organiz-
ing the legal regulation of the computer's processing of personal data.
First, privacy is conceptually linked to the notion of a private space. Sec-
ond, privacy is limited to intimate or familial activities or information
about such activities.
The notion of "spatial privacy" conceives of a limited physical area
within which information and objects are protected from governmental
intrusion.98 This space is meant to be the irreducible physical remnant of
the traditional private sphere of the market and family. Within it, the
individual is to be free to develop his personality and live his life.99 But
95. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33; infra text accompanying notes 107-109.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 108-109.
97. Tort law uses concepts of privacy in such areas as defamation and invasion of pri-
vacy. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (discussing constitutional lim-
its on a cause of action for invasion of privacy caused by publication of deceased rape victim's
name); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing constitutional limits on
state's power to award damages for libel); Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Pri-
vacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364 (1989) (conceptual emptiness of false
light tort matched by inadequacy of constitutional protections borrowed from defamation
model). The concept of privacy was introduced into tort law by a famous, and still controver-
sial, article in the Harvard Law Review. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). For criticism of this article, see Harry Kalven,
Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
326, 327 (1966) ("Although privacy is for me a great and important value, tort law's effort to
protect the right of privacy seems to me a mistake.").
98. See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1990) (protection against "warrant-
less entry of a person's home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects")
(citations omitted); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight guest has privacy inter-
est during stay in host's home); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("right to be free
from state inquiry into contents of [personal] library"); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
309 (1921) (protection from warrantless search of papers in defendant's desk).
99. The private sphere is implicated, for example, when one stays as an overnight guest in
someone's home. In a recent Supreme Court opinion, Justice White described the "privacy"
interest involved in such a stay in terms of the development of personality and the relation to
the person's life:
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the idea of a physical dimension of privacy retains little value today. Its
decline can be traced through the development of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment methodology.'0 °
The Fourth Amendment places a bar on certain kinds of govern-
mental snooping. It protects a domain of human activities from govern-
ment observation by requiring that the government obtain a valid
warrant, by showing "probable cause," before intruding into this private
domain.101 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has responded to techno-
logical invasions of the private domain by guarding against particular
types of intrusion only when the citizen can reasonably expect to be pro-
tected from such intrusions. According to the Court, the Fourth
Amendment protects only those subjective expectations of privacy that
society is willing to accept as reasonable. 0 2 Once technology diminishes
these expectations, the Court will not attempt to restrict incursions into
the private sphere.10 3 But even if the Supreme Court were to restrict the
use of intrusive technologies, its methodology, which defines privacy in
Staying overnight in another's home is a longstanding social custom that serves func-
tions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others' homes when we travel to a
strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our parents, children, or more
distant relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or when we
house-sit for a friend. We will all be hosts and we will all be guests many times in
our lives....
From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home pre-
cisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will
not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at
our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety
or the security of our belongings.
Olson, 495 U.S. at 98-99.
100. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. For discussion of the warrant requirement and "probable cause," see Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 411-19 (1969).
102. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy for marijuana grown in home greenhouse visible from heli-
copter); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-82 (1984) (no reasonable expectation of
privacy for marijuana grown in open field); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). This
test was first suggested in a concurrence by Justice Harlan. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52 (plurality opinion of White, J.) ("[T]here is nothing in
the record or before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this
country to lend substance to respondent's claim that he reasonably anticipated that his green-
house would not be subject to observation from that altitude."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 215 (1986) ("In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is rou-
terms of a physical area and the information found within it, would still
handicap an American response to the computer.
The computers that process personal data for the information soci-
ety and service administration are located outside the individual space
that is traditionally protected as private. Furthermore, once these com-
puters record information, this data can no longer be considered part of
the private preserve of the data subject. The information will, after all,
be viewed by a number of other people. The Supreme Court has already
held that the Fourth Amendment's protections are not applicable to lists
of telephone numbers, 104 copies of personal checks, 10 5 or files containing
an accountant's tax worksheets.10 6 These records are not in the posses-
sion of the individual to whom they refer, and thus are considered
outside the limited sphere protected by spatial privacy. Therefore, reli-
ance on the spatial aspect of privacy will not support the protection of
personal information in government data banks.
The second problematic legal interpretation of privacy views it in
terms of certain intimate or familial activities.10 7 These activities are
meant to form the essential domain of individual life. This interpretation
of privacy is particularly open to judicial manipulation that seeks either
to absolve the state of responsibility or to justify its actions. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court is in the process of finding that one particular
activity, abortion, is both private and not private. When the Court sees
abortion as a private act, it allows the state to prohibit the use of its
funds, facilities, or employees to perform abortions.10 8 And as it comes
to agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist that abortion is a medical opera-
tion that "is not 'private' in the ordinary sense of the word," the Court
permits the state more power to impose restrictions on the procedure. 109
tine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally
protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.").
This passivity in the face of technological developments has been criticized. See Riley,
488 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (court should consider whether police activity is
consistent with the "aims of a free and open society") (citing Anthony J. Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 403 (1974)).
104. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
105. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
106. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
107. These activities include educational decisions of parents, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and reproductive decisions of
the married or unmarried individual, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
108. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion of Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the
business of performing abortions.").
109. This argument was first made in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
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But even if the Supreme Court develops a more consistent jurisprudence
as to which types of behavior are to be protected from state regulation,
information relating to this behavior will still be collected and stored in
government and commercial data banks. The creation of records that
detail one's existence and way of life is a permanent condition of modem
society.
Thus, the initial trouble with the notion that privacy protects "inti-
mate" activities is that even if it does, records about these personal activi-
ties will still be produced and processed. For example, important
decisions about medical conditions are recorded by doctors and insur-
ance companies and are sometimes reviewed by governmental agen-
cies.110 One might try to organize legal rules for data banks based either
on the intimacy of the information they contain or on the importance of
the choice to which this information relates. But here, too, the computer
weakens the effectiveness of a privacy paradigm. The multifunctionality
of computer data means that legal protection cannot depend merely on
the area of life to which the information refers. Legal attention must be
directed to the context and goals of information processing-not merely
to whether data refers to intimate activities or sensitive choices. 1 ' Be-
cause the computer allows information that is not especially personal to
be used in ways destructive of the human personality, any approach that
bases protection solely on the data's sensitivity is irrelevant.
Privacy is not an ideal normative concept for the computer age. It
might protect the individual who has retreated from the world; it might
limit access to certain highly sensitive data. But it cannot guide a legal
response to the danger of the computer. A claim of privacy tends to
collapse in the face of the weighty reasons the state advances for seeking
personal information. Privacy does not help once the issue becomes not
whether, but how personal data should be collected and processed. Alter-
113, 128 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 501 (1989) (upholding state law that declares "[t]he life of each human being begins
at conception" and requires a physician, prior to performing an abortion on any woman whom
he has reason to believe is twenty or more weeks pregnant, to perform "such medical examina-
tions and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung
maturity of the unborn child"); cf Frances Olsen, Comment: Unraveling Compromise, 103
HARV. L. REv. 105, 132 (1989) ("The devaluation of women implicated in antiabortion laws
and policies leads to a multitude of coercive policies against women.").
110. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1976) (New York State creates centralized
data bank that contains information pertaining to prescription of certain drugs; Supreme
Court notes the difficulty in distinguishing intergovernmental use of this data bank from "a
host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health
care"). See also supra text accompanying notes 58-70.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
native paradigms must be explored. This Article proposes that two para-
digms should form the basis for an American data protection law:
bureaucratic justice and human autonomy.
(2) Bureaucratic Justice
In defining bureaucratic justice, this Article utilizes Jerry Mashaw's
neo-Weberian perspective. Mashaw's work is perhaps best known for its
examination of the characteristics of the activist state that lead to difficul-
ties when traditional adjudicative conflict resolution is imposed on bu-
reaucracy. 112 But Mashaw's ultimate concern is fashioning an "internal"
administrative law-an approach that combines uniform administration
with a "vision of justice."' 1
3
In pursuit of ideal administration, bureaucratic justice requires ac-
curate decisions made in a cost-efficient fashion.' 14 According to
Mashaw, the first two elements of bureaucratic justice-accuracy and ef-
ficiency-are dependent on the structuring of knowledge within bureau-
cracy. 15 This structure must provide a "connection between a particular
decision, given the factual context, and the accomplishment of one or
more of the decisionmaker's goals." ' 1 6 Not surprisingly, this approach is
dependent on data processing. Only the treatment of data as a flow
within a stream of rationally organized administrative activities seems
capable of providing the necessary knowledge in a precise fashion and at
an affordable price.
117
The final element of bureaucratic justice goes beyond accurate appli-
cation of efficient information retrieval. Bureaucratic justice requires not
only accuracy and efficiency, but also attention to the dignity of the par-
ticipants."" Dignity is protected through the appropriate process.119
This notion is developed by Mashaw through a description of bureau-
cratic administration that operates through a mysterious, unexplained
process that seems designed to humiliate participants. The experiences
of these participants resemble those of K. in Kafka's The Trial.,20
112. See MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 23-40.
113. Id. at 46.
114. Id. at 26.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 49.
117. Id. at 26, 195-97. See supra text accompanying notes 14-26.
118. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 95-96, 198-202; MASHAv, DUE
PROCESS, supra note 26, at 158-71; Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest
for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 887-88, 898-906 (1981).
119. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 177-80.
120. FRANZ KAFKA, DER PROZEB (M. Brod. ed., 1983); see id. at 103 ("All officials are
irritated, even if they seem to be calm."). See infra text accompanying notes 204-206.
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Mashaw describes how such an administration makes applicants and
beneficiaries feel:
They know only that they seem to be involved in an important decision
concerning their lives. But they have no idea what is relevant... [or]
what precisely the decision is about. Perhaps the only thing that be-
comes clear in such a process is that if and when a decision is made,
the participants will not be given any understandable reasons for it.12 1
This kind of process diminishes the participants' feelings of self-worth. It
also makes participants question the legitimacy of the decisions that are
made.122 In such a bureaucracy, justice becomes impossible.
Bureaucratic justice is administrative decisionmaking that pays ap-
propriate attention to accuracy, cost-effectiveness, and the dignity of the
participants. These values often compete with one another, but bureau-
cratic justice becomes impossible without respect for all three of them.
In some instances, the dignity of the participant may not only be ne-
glected, but actually attacked. The kind of neglect present in the preced-
ing description of Kafkaesque procedures will, over time, have a
significant effect on the program participant. Under these conditions, ad-
ministration not only has a destructive effect on bureaucratic justice, but
also undermines the autonomy of the individual.
(3) Autonomy
Underlying this Article's paradigm of autonomy is John Stuart
Mill's conception of liberty. In On Liberty, Mill makes explicit the con-
nection between human autonomy and the survival of a democratic or-
der.123 He begins with a discussion of the opposite of the autonomous:
the automaton.124 Mill uses this figure, an object of fascination through-
out his century, 125 to illustrate the importance of self-determination to
critical reflection: "Human nature is not a machine to be built after a
model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which
121. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 175.
122. For a psychologist's empirical exploration of the connection between the behavior of
people towards the law and the way that they are treated, see TOm R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (1990). For development and discussion of "process values" from a legal
perspective, see Frank Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process,
18 NOMOs 126 (1977).
123. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 3 (A. Castell ed., 1947) (1859).
124. Id. at 59.
125. See, eg., EDGAR ALLEN POE, Maelzel's Chess Player (1836), in WORKS OF EDGAR
ALLEN POE (New York, Century 1909) (review of "wonderful automata" and discussion of
whether this chess-playing machine is a "pure machine" or fraud). This fascination with auto-
matons has, more recently, been a theme of a series of stories by the American writer Steven
Millhauser. See, e.g., STEVEN MILLHAUSER, August Eschenburg, in IN THE PENNY ARCADE
(1986).
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requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency
of the inward forces which make it a living thing."1 26 The organic is
preferred to the mechanical; the individual person to the machine. For
Mill, "[o]ne whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no charac-
ter, no more than a steam-engine has a character."1 27
Mill's concept of autonomy includes a capacity for critical reflection
regarding one's values and preferences.128 The tie between this personal
quality and democracy is a close one. Mill argues that a people that are
able to carry on "public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence,
order, and decision... will never let [itself] be enslaved by any man or
body of men."' 129 Thus, autonomy matters for both the individual and
society.
Although Mill discusses the autonomous as well as the automaton,
he does not explicitly consider the effect of mechanical devices on the
individual. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider and develop Mill's
definition of autonomy. A conception of autonomy as a capacity for crit-
ical reflection is not incompatible with limitations on one's ultimate exte-
rior choices (as Mill himself admits). I 30 Sometimes these limitations may
even be self-imposed. Autonomous behavior can be exercised, for exam-
ple, by followers of a religion who choose to live according to its ten-
ets. I 13 Just as autonomy is not precluded by some restrictions on choice,
it likewise is not precluded by various unconscious and irrational influ-
ences on decisionmaking. All human thought and action are, in fact,
subject to these factors. 32 Nonetheless, Mill's definition of autonomy
must be extended in one important way.
Millian critical reflection depends upon the maintenance of an ex-
pansive private sphere secure from the workings of the state; it is this
refuge that provides the citizen with the opportunity to engage in the
critical reflection upon which his or her participation in public life de-
pends. 33 Yet the public and private spheres have now been transformed
126. MILL, supra note 123, at 59. See generally ICARL BRITTON, JOHN STUART MILL 71
(1969) ("The key to Mill's doctrine is his concern for individual character.").
127. MILL, supra note 123, at 59.
128. See id. at 13 (importance of "inward domain of consciousness" to liberty); GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 28-29 (1988) (critical reflection as
basis of autonomy in Mill's work).
129. MILL, supra note 123, at 114.
130. See id. at 5 ("discussion of rules of conduct" to be imposed by law and rules of
conduct to be imposed by opinion).
131. DWORKIN, supra note 128, at 17.
132. See KATZ, supra note 60, at 114-21 (discussing mental processes).
133. Mill discusses the extent of this sphere in setting out the proper and improper areas
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into a single social arena.'34 Little remains of the private refuge. As a
result, autonomy must be defined not as isolated thought in a private
domain, but rather as critical thought that asserts itself through commu-
nicative competence in the social sphere.
In one of the most significant philosophical undertakings of our era,
Jiirgen Habermas explores the development of a theory of communica-
tive action. He examines how the state and other social actors carry out
a "colonialization of the lifeworld" of the individual and thereby hinder
the development of democratic values.13 5 Habermas believes that demo-
cratic forms both create and depend on a discursive building of consen-
sus. 13 6 For our purposes, it suffices to draw from these studies a view of
autonomy that includes not only the ability to make personal assessments
but also the capacity to participate in social and political life.
137
With the concepts of bureaucratic justice and autonomy in mind,
this Article will now examine data processing in the context of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Child Support Enforce-
ment (CSE). These programs have been chosen for two reasons. To be-
gin with, a few studies have already pointed to problems with the current
American constitutional right of informational privacy and with the Pri-
vacy Act.'38 The constitutional and statutory standards furnish general
norms that guide the regulation of many kinds of data processing activi-
ties. Equally important, however, are the sectoral regulations that gov-
ern specific administrative operations. These regulations have been
subject to scant scholarly attention. Thus, American data protection law
for state action. MILL, supra note 123, at 95-118. He concludes this discussion with a
warning:
The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individ-
uals and bodies, [government] substitutes its own activity for theirs .... The worth
of a State, in the long run, is the worth of individuals composing it; and a State which
postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of
administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of
business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instru-
ments in its hands even for beneficial purposes-will find that with small men no
great thing can really be accomplished.
Id. at 117-18 (emphasis in original).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 27-44.
135. 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS (1981).
136. Id. at 221.
137. See JORGEN HABERMAS, TECHNOLOGIE UND WISSENSCHAFT ALS "IDEOLOGIE" 131
(1969) (difficulties of participatory role for public in discussions between politicians and
experts).
138. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 305-70; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 677-86, 694-98; PRI-
VACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: AN ASSESSMENT (1977).
currently requires an evaluation of the impact of data processing as it is
actually carried out in specific programs.
A second reason for carrying out case studies of AFDC and CSE is
that these programs are emblematic examples of state service administra-
tions. Their weaknesses may well be representative of the shortcomings
of data processing in other government programs, and understanding
these weaknesses may, therefore, help to develop a more precise under-
standing of how government administration actually functions. The pur-
pose of this Article here is to refine the approach of those scholars of
administrative law who seek to use law to structure the application of
agency expertise.
139
B. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
AFDC, one of our most important social programs, is a federal
grant program that assists needy families with children.140 It responds to
the tremendous poverty in America by targeting children who are in
need of help.' 4 ' AFDC was first enacted in 1935 as part of the Social
Security Act. 142 It initially provided assistance only to families where
one parent was absent, incapacitated, or deceased.' 43 Currently, AFDC
also provides assistance to children in needy families that are considered
"intact." 144 Responsibility for administering the program rests with the
states. 145
139. See infra text accompanying notes 2 and 113.
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-645 (1988 & Supp. 111990). See generally MIARMOR ET AL., supra
note 38, at 82-127 (discussing the background and weaknesses of the AFDC program and its
place in the American "insurance/opportunity" state).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988). See Rodriguez v. Vowell, 472 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir.) (con-
gressional purpose behind AFDC program is to assist dependent children by also meeting
needs of their caretaking relatives), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944 (1973); NATIONAL CENTER FOR
CHILDREN IN POVERTY, FIVE MILLION CHILDREN: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF OUR
POOREST YOUNG CITIZENS 16 (1990) (nearly one of every four children under age six in the
United States is poor; from 1979 to 1983, the number of poor children under six increased by
approximately 50%); Stephen A. Holmes, Once Welfare Meant Someone Else, But Recession
Brings Home Its Sting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991, at A12 ("As the economy worsens, the
nation's welfare caseload has exploded.").
142. For discussion of the legislative history and purposes of AFDC, see 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3287; MARMOR ET AL., supra note 38, at 62-96.
143. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600-03 (1972) (AFDC eligibility for chil-
dren only when one parent is continually absent from home).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (aid to "needy dependent children and the parents or
relatives with whom they are living"); SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, FAMILY SECURITY ACT
OF 1988, S. REP. No. 377, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988) [hereinafter SENATE FINANCE
COMM. REPORT] ("equity and basic concern for the welfare of children" require that benefits
be provided to "intact families in which the principal parent is unemployed").
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing for filing of state plans with
federal government); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422 (1970) (aspect of New York State
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Another response to poverty that targets children for help is Child
Support Enforcement (CSE). CSE, which was established in 1975 as part
D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, seeks "to strengthen families and
reduce welfare spending" by making noncustodial parents pay their
share of child support.146 The CSE and AFDC programs are, thus, re-
lated in a number of ways. Both attempt to keep children out of poverty.
Moreover, by seeking to make delinquent parents pay child support, CSE
is a social program that seeks to reduce the amount of money paid by the
AFDC program.147 Both programs also rely on the data processing ca-
pability of computers.
(1) Reasons for Reliance on the Data Processing Model
In the initial decades after its introduction in 1935, AFDC was ad-
ministered by professional staffs that personally scrutinized applicants
and often relied upon local norms.148 These managers had frequent op-
portunities to make discretionary judgments. 149 Today, AFDC is admin-
istered by a centralized state bureaucracy that depends on computer
scrutiny of data instead of an individual evaluation of each applicant.150
The processing of claims is carried out by low-level clerks, whose own
performance is evaluated by a small number of upper echelon officials
using the statistical models of AFDC's so-called "quality control
system."
151
The parallels with industrial production suggested by the name of
this supervisory plan are not accidental. In both industry and govern-
ment, there has been an emphasis on reducing all treatment of informa-
tion, whether relating to production or the delivery of human services, to
a mechanical flow. But when the state relies on the model of a machine
to shape a particular form of social interaction, some justification is felt
to be necessary. Three specific explanations have been given for the
transformation of AFDC into a processor of personal data.
plan for apportioning AFDC payments violates federal statute); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
316 (1968) (AFDC program is a scheme of "cooperative federalism").
146. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS I
(1988).
147. Id. at 8-9.
148. Simon, supra note 2, at 1201-03; Jerry L. Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Ad-
ministration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REv. 818, 821
n.8 (1971).
149. Simon, supra note 2, at 1204; Mashaw, supra note 148, at 823.
150. Simon, supra note 2, at 1211-17.
151. The system is mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. I 1989).
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The primary explanation is that scarce resources must be distributed
among a high volume of applicants. 152 This situation encourages ex-
ploitation of the computer's rapid treatment of enormous data banks and
its multifunctionality. In addition, the abuses of administrative discre-
tion within the old system are believed to call for the transformation of
AFDC into a processor of personal data. These abuses included mid-
night searches of the homes of welfare recipients and the application of
widely different local norms within the same state.1 53 In some rural ar-
eas, the hostility of local administrators towards aid applicants caused
them to deny meritorious applications and to ignore procedures secured
by law for applicants. 154 The computer appears to offer a way to control
such abuses of discretion. 155
The final explanation for the reliance of AFDC on the data process-
ing model is related to the need to respond to bureaucratic abuse of dis-
cretion. The Supreme Court's decisions in Goldberg v. Kelly1 56 and its
progeny sought to control unstructured discretion by granting hearing
rights to those citizens who had cognizable interests in certain benefits.15 7
But the Supreme Court's insistence on the enforcement of hearing rights
diminishes once subjective judgments about individual cases are replaced
by seemingly objective criteria.15 8 Agencies can seek to avoid the de-
mands of Goldberg v. Kelly by relying on computerized data processing
that has a seductive precision which seems to offer the desired objectivity.
152. For discussion of this argument, see Simon, supra note 2, at 1252-53. See also
MARMOR ET AL., supra note 38, at 35-36 (U.S. spends more than twice as much on social
insurance than social welfare; only 14% of means-tested benefits are in the form of welfare
assistance); id. at 69-70 (AFDC and Food Stamps programs "are simply too small to have
much bearing on the affordability of the welfare state").
153. See Mashaw, supra note 148, at 830; Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches
and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).
154. Mashaw, supra note 148, at 837-39.
155. The computer controls this discretion by providing seemingly objective standards to
be applied through analysis of personal data.
156. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
157. Id at 263-71; Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
158. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 465-68 (1983) (upholding reliance of Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services on medical-vocational guidelines); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971) (pointing to "sheer magnitude of the administrative burden" and
upholding benefit decision that relies on hospital records and written reports of physicians); see
also STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAwV AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 806 (3d ed. 1992) ("there might seldom be any need for due process mandated
hearings" following the establishment of "clear, readily verifiable objective criteria for eligibil-
ity for entitlement").
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(2) AFDC and the Computer
There were, then, reasons enough to. shift to a data processing
model, but reliance on this model has shaped the form and effect of
AFDC. By allowing the reduction of personal information to a stan-
dardized flow, the data processing approach increases the extent to
which mechanical rules control decisionmaking.15 9 It also allows the re-
placement of professional workers who have extensive training with
clerks who are only expected to process paper and run machines. 16°
More powerful technology is then sought to further speed the processing
of the data flow and to control the machines already in place and the
clerks who work with them.
The most recent changes in AFDC, implemented by the Family
Support Act of 1988 (FSA or Act), 161 illustrate this pattern. Most of the
discussion of this law has centered around its "workfare" provisions.
162
But this Act also compels states to increase their computer facilities, pro-
vides federal grants to help fund these facilities, creates new links be-
tween these facilities through increased sharing and matching of data,
and requires all parents to obtain a social security number for their chil-
dren at birth.163
The administrators of AFDC now use computers to scrutinize a va-
riety of computer records held in the public and private sectors. Crucial
to this scrutiny is the social security number. 164 This number, which is
now required before acceptance into AFDC and other government pro-
159. Simon, supra note 2, at 1217.
160. Id at 1211.
161. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2409 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-
655 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); see William K. Stevens, Welfare Bill: His-
toric Scope But Gradual Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1988, at A20 (law strives to change
welfare dependency "to job holding independence"); Andrew Hacker, Getting Rough on the
Poor, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Oct. 13, 1988, at 12, 17 (criticizing work requirement as return "to
the harsh rules of an earlier era").
163. These requirements are found in Title I of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-652 (1988 &
Supp. 11989).
164. The social security number was developed as part of the Social Security Act, one of
the first laws that put the federal government into the business of gathering large amounts of
personal information. BENIGER, supra note 7, at 408-11; PRIVACY STUDY REPORT, supra note
40, at 607-08. As part of the establishment of a federal program of old age insurance for
workers, Congress required the government to maintain employment records relating to the
employment histories of twenty-six million people. The technical task has grown: the Social
Security Administration currently maintains records on almost all Americans, provides ad-
ministrative services for four federal agencies, and administers ten programs other than Social
Security. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 75 (1986) [hereinafter SOCIAL SECUR-
rry & TECHNOLOGY]. In the pre-computer age, this bureaucracy depended upon the use of
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grams, helps identify and consolidate data about citizens stored in vari-
ous government files. 165 It aids computer matching and the discovery of
"hits," which is the term for an apparent match between the identity of a
welfare recipient and membership in a group to which the recipient
should not belong, such as income tax refund recipients or owners of cars
worth more than the maximum allowed. 166 Once the computer discovers
this match, further investigations are carried out by the state agency. 167
punched cards to handle data, a system invented by Herman Hollerith at the end of the nine-
teenth century.
The most important bureaucratic innovation of the Social Security Act was the rigorous
assignment of nine digit numbers to all participants in the program. BENIGER, supra note 7, at
409. These numbers, which were adopted to increase the ability of government to process
data, disturbed many because of their impersonal nature and their potential to become a na-
tional identity number. Id At the time, the Social Security Administration promised that the
social security number would be treated as confidential and would be limited to use in the
social security program. This promise was not kept: submitting this number has become a
prerequisite for access to numerous government program benefits. See, eg., Disclosure and
Verification of Social Security Numbers and Employer Identification Numbers by Applicants
and Participants in HUD Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,680, 39,680-92 (1989) (codified at 24
C.F.R. §§ 200.1001-200.1125 (1991)) (requiring submission of social security numbers in fed-
eral housing programs by all assistance applicants and "each member of the applicant's house-
hold who is at least six years of age").
165. The social security number has facilitated the creation of a national identification
system; in governmental nomenclature, this number becomes a "personal identification
number," or PIN. By providing a de facto national identification number, the government has
encouraged the creation of a series of decentralized national data banks. ELECTRONIC REC-
ORD SySms, supra note 76, at 111-12. Data banks that rely on the social security number
exist in both the public and private sectors. For purposes of obtaining consumer credit, for
example, the social security number has become the key to establishing one's identity and
resources.
Legal challenges to such use of the social security number have been consistently unsuc-
cessful; the association of technological management with progress and efficiency has led
courts to be reluctant to handicap information-processing bureaucracies. See McElrath v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding requirement that welfare recipients
obtain and disclose social security numbers as "rationally related and essential to... effective
administration"); Green v. Philbrook, 576 F.2d 440, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding federal
and state regulations that, as part of eligibility for welfare, require children to obtain and
furnish social security numbers); Cantor v. Supreme Court, 353 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(upholding state bar requirement that attorneys file their social security number at time of
payment of annual dues). But see Greater Cleveland Welfare Rights Org. v. Bauer, 462 F.
Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (requiring government to make "meaningful disclosure" of
planned use of social security numbers).
On February 27, 1991, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee held a hearing on
abuses of the social security number and began to consider drafting legislation to restrict use of
the number. PRIVACY J., Feb. 1991, at 5; Michael W. Miller, Lawmakers Begin to Heed Calls
to Protect Privacy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1991, at A16.
166. Kenneth J. Langlan, Computer Matching Programs: A Threat to Privacy, 15 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 143, 169-71 (1979).
167. Id at 145.
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AFDC has progressed from midnight searches of the welfare benefi-
ciary's home to continuous searches of the beneficiary's personal data.
Unlike residential searches, data searches are carried out in the absence
of the program applicant or participant, and far away from his or her
home. A list of data sharing and matching carried out by the Arkansas
Department of Human Services in administering AFDC is set out in Ta-
ble A. 168 This table shows the enormous amount of information to
which AFDC offices have access.
From the Social Security Administration, AFDC receives access to
the BENDEX and SDX data systems. BENDEX, or the Beneficiary
Data System, contains information relating to Title II payments (Federal
Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits) and Wage and
Pension payments.1 69 SDX lists the names of those eligible for Medicare
as well as Supplemental Security Income payment data.170 From the In-
ternal Revenue Service, AFDC receives data relating to the tax intercep-
tion and parent locator programs.1 71 Within state government, AFDC
receives information from the Employment Security Division (worker's
compensation and employment) and the Child Support Enforcement
Unit (child support payments). 172 AFDC offices also receive information
about unemployment payments from other states.
These Arkansas data comparisons are typical of the extensive data
bases that are manipulated in administering the AFDC program. They
illustrate how the capabilities of the computer have affected government
administration through the encouragement of technical management and
the solidification of contact with the state. The connection between the
citizen and the state is made closer each time a data base is updated or a
data search is carried out. Arkansas data use also indicates that data
processing and sharing are likely to engender confusion among program
applicants and beneficiaries. In Arkansas, caseworkers explain some of
168. See infra page 1389. This list was developed in a series of interviews with state
AFDC officials and through study of official documents. See, eg., 45 C.F.R. § 205.51 (1991)
(income and eligibility verification requirements); Memorandum to EMS Field Representatives
Relating to Workers Compensation Match (Oct. 19, 1989); Social Security Enumeration Re-
quirement (FA 2250) (Dec. 15, 1988); Memorandum from Arkansas Office of Program Opera-
tions to All County Directors Relating to Social Security Numbers (Dec. 6, 1982) (on file with
author); Executive Directive No. ED MS 82-3 from Arkansas Social Services (Feb. 10, 1982)
(on file with author).
169. Executive Directive No. ED MS 82-3 from Arkansas Social Services (Feb. 10, 1982)
(on file with author).
170. Food Stamp Certification Manual, The SSN Requirement/IEVS, § 2530 (Dec. 1,
1989) (on file with author); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELIGIBILITY VERIFICA-
TIONS AND PRIVACY IN FEDERAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS 5-18 (1985).
171. 45 C.F.R. § 205.56 (1991); 45 C.F.R. § 235.70 (1991).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 663(e) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 235.70 (1991).
these data exchanges orally to program applicants; nothing is presented
to them in written form. 173 AFDC applicants will, therefore, receive or
be denied aid based on factors that they are unlikely to kmow of or
understand.
The AFDC program manipulates data to compare personal infor-
mation collected for different purposes at different times. Once the
AFDC bureaucracy is viewed as a processor of data, that is, as a kind of
machine, it may seem worthwhile to try to improve the product (the per-
sonal data) through data exchanges. As on an assembly line, the product
is treated to be free from impurities. There are, however, two important
objections to this approach: the first questions the value of data match-
ing; the second criticizes the way in which extensive data processing in-
creases the burden of gaining access to the AFDC program.
Data matching has been defined as electronic comparison of two or
more sets of personal records. 174 Despite the popularity of this tech-
nique, its efficiency is uncertain. In a detailed analysis of matching pro-
grams, the Office of Technology Assessment noted that there is no
evidence that computer matching is always cost effective. It also con-
cluded that the efficacy of computer matching in detecting fraud is over-
rated, 175 and that client fraud comprises only a small percentage of the
total waste in federal programs. One official estimate attributes ninety-
seven percent of the losses in the distribution of health and human ser-
vice benefits to "management inefficiency and program misuse" rather
than clidnt-fraud. 176 But if the value of data matching is contested, some
of its less desirable effects are perfectly clear.
173. The list of data exchanges was prepared through independent research and discus-
sions with state officials. For examples of written material given to the welfare applicant, see
Arkansas Div. of Economic Medical Servs., Application for AFDC/Medicaid Assistance
EMS-95 (R 4/92) (on file with author) [hereinafter Application for AFDC/Medicaid Assist-
ance]; Aid to Families With Dependent Children, Information Booklet (SS-Pub.-013 (R 1/86)-
190130) (on file with author).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
175. ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS, supra note 76, at 50-53; see U.S. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: ASSESSING ITS COSTS AND BENEFITS 72-79
(1986) (survey of seventeen federal agencies shows consideration or assessments of costs and
benefits for these matches varied considerably in nature and timing).
176. ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS, supra note 76, at 50 (citing INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEP'T HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT); see PRESIDENT'S COUN-
CIL ON MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT AND THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY, MODEL FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL OVER AUTOMATED IN-
FORMATION SYSTEMS iii (1988) ("A recent examination of actual instances of fraud, waste,
and abuse shows that the majority of problems are usually employees who said they had no
fear of being caught because they were aware of the inadequacy of existing system controls and
management oversight."); MARC BENDICK ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF AFDC ERRORS 23, 55
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The current application of the data processing model of administra-
tion engenders the belief that accuracy and efficiency can be improved
only by more complex schemes of information use. 177 These new
schemes require more detailed paperwork and more extensive documen-
tation by the applicant. Thus, instead of forming part of a strategy to
identify the needy and to give them the kind of aid that they need, data
processing renders acceptance into the AFDC program a complex and
technical ordeal. Data matching seeks to improve the quality of informa-
tion submitted by those who wish to receive social services. Yet the so-
cially disadvantaged who seek access to AFDC are often ill-equipped to
fill out the required forms and provide all the necessary documents.
There is a striking contrast between the millions of dollars spent on
computerized data processing and the scant resources devoted to helping
potential welfare recipients fill out paperwork and comply with docu-
mentation requirements. Attempting to improve the efficiency of the
AFDC system by increasing its technical capacity ignores the reason why
most applicants are refused welfare. A study of AFDC, sponsored in
part by the Southern Governors' Association and the Southern Legisla-
tive Conference, shows that less than a quarter of all denials of assistance
can be attributed to excess personal income.178 The majority of such de-
nials are due, rather, to "Failure to Comply with Procedural Require-
ments." 179 Thus, the technical complexities of AFDC appear to be more
(1978) (largest factor in errors in distribution of AFDC is "administrative practices"; client
fraud present in only about two percent of cases).
177. See RICHARD KUSSEROW, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., COMPUTER MATCHING IN STATE ADMINISTERED BENEFIT PROGRAMS: A MAN-
AGER'S GUIDE TO DECISIONMAKING 7 (1983) ("Without proper managerial oversight, com-
puter matching can easily assume a life of its own. The technological imperative can take over,
cranking out data and generating organizational activity that gives the appearance of progress
but actually accomplishes little."); BENDICK ET AL., supra note 176, at 9 ("[W]e found a ten-
dency in some circumstances for reduced errors to be achieved at the expense of inordinately
increased administrative costs or reduction in the accessibility of AFDC benefits to persons
legally entitled to them.").
178. SARAH C. SHUPTRINE & VICKI C. GRANT, SOUTHERN REGIONAL PROJECT ON IN-
FANT MORTALITY, STUDY OF THE AFDC/MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY PROCESS IN THE SOUTH-
ERN STATES 4 (1988) [hereinafter SHUPTRINE & GRANT, AFDC/MEDICAID AVAILABILITY];
SARAH C. SHUPTRINE & VICKI C. GRANT, THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE REASONS FOR DE-
NIAL OF AFDC/MEDICAID BENEFITS TO THE UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES 1-3
(1988) [hereinafter SHUPTRINE & GRANT, REASONS FOR DENIAL].
179. SHUPTRINE & GRANT, AFDC/MEDICAID AVAILABILITY, supra note 178, at 5-6; see
SOUTHERN REGIONAL PROJECT ON INFANT MORTALITY, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BARRI-
ERS TO ACCESSING WIC, AFDC, AND MEDICAID SERVICES 22 (1989) [hereinafter BARRIERS
TO ACCESS] (follow-up report based on state site visits finds "[s]ince negative errors are not
considered in... management reviews the message to the eligibility worker is that inappropri-
ate denials are less important than inappropriate approvals."); see also BENDICK ET AL., supra
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successful at keeping deserving applicants from obtaining welfare than at
identifying the undeserving. The bureaucratic structure of the data
processing system through which social services are currently delivered
forms a bar to helping the needy. 180
(3) Effects on Bureaucratic Justice and Autonomy
This analysis of data processing within the administration of AFDC
suggests some negative effects on bureaucratic justice and autonomy.
The current system of data processing has a complex impact on the first
two elements of bureaucratic justice-accuracy and efficiency. This Arti-
cle has already mentioned the Office of Technology Assessment's identifi-
cation of an overestimation of the value of matching in detecting fraud in
the distribution of social services. Other studies have criticized the com-
puter's impact on accuracy and efficiency when it is employed to derive a
"case error rate" as part of a "quality control system."181
In the AFDC program, a social worker's "case error rate" is audited
by checking the original familial data and the worker's decisions against
the program's norms. 182 Some evidence indicates, however, that this rate
sometimes varies more because of changes in how the case error rate is
derived than because of anything social workers do or do not accom-
plish. 183 Thus, the case error rate, the way that AFDC judges its
achievements, can depend on technical factors that may have only a tan-
gential relationship to anything other than the system's internal data
structure.
As currently applied in the AFDC program, the computer's data
processing also has a negative effect on the third element of bureaucratic
justice, the dignity of the program participant. Mashaw has observed
that a decisional process will contribute to a participant's sense of aliena-
tion, terror, and self-hatred if it does not give "adequate notice of the
note 176, at 58 (only 11% of documents given to AFDC clients written at a level where three-
quarters of clients can understand them).
180. Indeed, those individuals who are most in need of assistance may be among those
least capable of dealing with the paperwork requirements. BARRIERS TO AccESS, supra note
179, at 21; see SHUPTRINE & GRANT, AFDC/MEDICAID AVAILABILITY, supra note 178, at 8
("Forty-five percent of all denials across the nation occurred in the South, even though the
South renders a decision on only 35% of all applications. The probability is greater in the
Southern States that a person will be poor,... and that an application for benefits will be
denied.").
181. Simon, supra note 2, at 1208-09; Evelyn Brodkin & Michael K. Lipsey, Quality Con-
trol in AFDC as an Administrative Strategy, 57 Soc. SERV. REv. 1 (1983).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. I 1989) (establishing an AFDC quality control system);
45 C.F.R. § 205.40 (1991) (regulations relating to quality control system).
183. Simon, supra note 2, at 1208-09.
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issues to be decided, of the evidence that is relevant to these issues, and of
how the decisional process itself works."
184
The AFDC decisionmaking process provides no such notice. Appli-
cants are unlikely to understand where their data will be matched or how
it will be used in decisionmaking. They must fill out a bewildering series
of forms and are expected to supply extensive additional documentation.
They are then given only an incomplete oral explanation of where their
data will be matched. The state requires applicants to provide the name
of every member in their household; inquires as to applicants' resources
(including whether they have a burial plot or crypt and whether they
own any vehicles or tools); and reminds applicants that "family planning
(birth control)" is a service for which they may be eligible.18 5 In a com-
prehensive study of the AFDC program, David Ellwood concludes that
"[tihe current system offers modest benefits while imposing a ridiculous
array of rules that rob recipients of security and self-esteem."
18 6
The dignity of the AFDC caseworker is also affected by data
processing. William Simon aptly describes the effect on the government
employee:
The worker's success depends on compliance with coercively enforced,
intensely monitored rules that primarily require her to police the
claimant's paper-pushing and bureaucratic hoop-jumping .... [T]he
worker encounters the claimant as either a threat or a nuisance-a
threat to the extent the claimant is a potential source of damaging in-
formation to supervisors monitoring the worker's performance, a nui-
sance to the extent that the claimant makes requests that the system
disables or penalizes the worker for responding to.
187
Whether or not the dignity of more highly placed bureaucrats is affected
by this data processing, their behavior certainly is. At a local department
of human services that I visited in Arkansas, the chief administrator's
wall was covered with a blackboard listing the federal and state "error
rates" permitted by various support programs.188 Monthly audits let the
bureau chief know if "production" is meeting the official "quality"
standards.
Although application of the computer in the AFDC program may
hinder the achievement of bureaucratic justice, the state has not critically
184. MASHAw, DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 176.
185. Application for AFDC/Medicaid Assistance, supra note 173.
186. DAVID I. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 4 (1988).
187. Simon, supra note 2, at 1221. See BARRIERS TO AccEss, supra note 179, at 20 (quot-
ing staff of state human service agency: "Process and procedural requirements focus the case
worker on accuracy of information rather than on helping the person become eligible.").
188. Interview with Roy Edson, Chief Administrator, Arkansas Department of Human
Services, Fayetteville Branch (Oct. 1990).
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assessed the computer's effect on the program applicant and the pro-
gram's objectives. Rather, the state relies on a simplistic belief in "in-
strumental rationality." Max Horkheimer uses this term to describe a
belief in the perfection of machines and the need to master nature.18 9
The state assumes that the application of ever more powerful computers
to carry out more data processing is the best means to fulfill the objec-
tives of AFDC. What is needed is critical thought by state officials as to
how the computer's data processing can meet the demands of bureau-
cratic justice in the AFDC program. This kind of analysis requires a
weighing of the implications of social policies and of how computers are
used to carry out these policies.
The state must also consider how data processing in the AFDC pro-
gram affects autonomy. This Article has defined autonomy as the ability
to make decisions and to act on these decisions through participation in
social and political life.190 Interestingly enough, the AFDC program
claims to support such participatory values. The policy behind AFDC,
as expressed in a recent report of the Senate's Committee on Finance, is
to improve "family responsibility and community obligation." 191 The
Supreme Court recognized this purpose when it stated: "Welfare, by
meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the
reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community."' 192 Yet AFDC, as
a wide variety of critics have observed, has fostered dependence in many
program participants. Rather than leading to participation in the com-
munity, it has led to passivity and dependency on the state.1 93 It is worth
speculating as to how the computer may have contributed to this effect.
Instead of Mashaw's proposed "bureaucracy with a human face,"
AFDC offers control through the computer. The computer enables the
government to inventory extensive, detailed knowledge of virtually all
aspects of a program participant's existence. AFDC applicants are asked
a wide variety of personal questions; computers constantly verify this
personal data. By allowing information to be shared and combined
189. MAX HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON (1947). Horkheimer writes, "Having
given up autonomy, reason has become an instrument.... Reason has become completely
harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the domination of men and
nature, has been made the sole criterion." Id. at 21.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 123-137.
191. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 144, at 8.
192. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
193. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 186, at 115 (welfare has isolating effect). The Family
Support Act of 1988 attacked welfare dependency by stressing the importance of work training
for AFDC beneficiaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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throughout government and society, this digitalization of personal infor-
mation heightens the ability of bureaucracies to "adapt an individual to a
predetermined, standardized behavior that aims at the highest possible
degree of compliance." 194 By using personal data to shape behavior pat-
terns, the state may repress the ability of individuals to make free deci-
sions about values and preferences and to act on these choices.
Although John Stuart Mill seemed to place men and women beyond
the influence of machines, these devices in fact exert pressure on humans
to conform to their rules. In Mill's time, the steam engine had already
started to change the way people lived and worked. 195 In our age, the
computer pressures men and women to conform to digital reality.
196
This pressure, which is dreadfully exacerbated by uncertainty as to the
government's processing of personal data, can have a negative effect on
the human ability to make free choices.
It may be possible to explain how this repression occurs. The reduc-
tion from critical, social actor to an earlier, more passive stage of human
development may occur by reversing an important aspect of childhood
development-the gradual separation of the developing individual from
the caregiver.197 This separation between one's self and that of others
depends, in large part, upon the degree of control over concealment and
exposure of personal information.19 8 Personal information can be shared
to develop a basis for trust, but the mandatory disclosure of personal
information can have a destructive effect on human independence.1 99
Though the nature of the psychological basis for human autonomy is
194. Simitis, Reviewing Privacy, supra note 81, at 707, 710.
195. See STRANDH, supra note 10, at 121 (in the nineteenth century, "effects of steam
power were felt not only in the field of technology but also in most areas of human
civilization").
196. This digital reality is created through the interrelation of software created by com-
puter programmers with the personal data that computers process. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 65-69, 85-93.
197. Sigmund Freud, Family Romances, in 9 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COM-
PLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 237 (James Strachey et al. eds., 1959);
Paul Kramer, On Discovering One's Identity, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND LAW
313 (Jay Katz et al. eds., 1967).
198. David Rapaport, The Theory of Ego Autonomy in Psychoanalysis and Law, in PSY-
CHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND LA V, supra note 197, at 300; ERvING GOFFMAN, STIGMA
99-129 (1963).
199. For discussion of this point, see the seminal accounts in Ruth Gavison, Privacy and
the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 454 (1980) and Charles Fried, Privacy, 74 YALE L.J. 475
(1968). See also ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 251-54 (2d ed. 1963) (destruc-
tive impact of shame on autonomy); ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH, DIE UNFAHIGKEIT ZU
TRAUERN 8 (1967) ("the weakest part of our emotional organization is our capacity for critical
thought") (translated from original).
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open to different explanations, the mutability of human autonomy is be-
yond question.
Totalitarian regimes have already demonstrated the fragility of the
human capacity for autonomy. The effectiveness of these regimes in ren-
dering adults as helpless as children is in large part a product of the
uncertainty that they instill regarding their use of personal informa-
tion.200 These regimes have relied on information gathering by stool pi-
geons, spies, and even children who have been encouraged to report on
the activities of their parents and teachers.20 1 The recent opening of
archives in the former German Democratic Republic has made available
a wealth of material on information gathering in East Germany. The
East German secret police created a dense network of full- and part-time
spies; virtually no neighborhood or apartment was without coverage.
202
The goal of the secret police was the constant observation of the entire
population of East Germany and the resulting promotion of a sense of
danger in all human relations.20 3 The lesson here is generally applicable:
a lack of legal restrictions on the collection of personal information will
ultimately have a deleterious impact on fundamental human values such
as love, honor, and democracy.
The corrosive effect of boundless data collection and processing on
autonomy is also suggested by Kafka in The Trial Mashaw refers to this
book in his examination of the dignity element of bureaucratic justice,
200. For the classic treatment of this theme, see GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). For
another approach, see MILAN KUNDERA, THE JOKE (Michael H. Heim trans., 1982). See also
Rapaport, supra note 198, at 303-05 (discussing destructive result of "interference with the
ego's autonomy from the environment"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L.
REV. 737, 794 (1989) (development of "anti-totalitarian right to privacy" that "prevents the
state from imposing on individuals a defined identity").
201. See generally WALTER WEYRAUCH, GESTAPO V-LEUTE (1989) (analysis of Gestapo
card file listing informers).
202. JOACHIM GAUCK, DIE STASI-AxTEN 36, 49 (1991); DAVID GILL & ULRICH
SCHRrTTER, DAS MINISTERIUM FOR STAATSSICHERHEIr 95 (1991).
203. GAUCK, supra note 202, at 41. The regulation of access to the files of the secret police
has been one of the most difficult issues involved in the unification of Germany. German law
has established legal regulations to govern application of this information and has set up a
special commissioner to oversee these files. See Gesetz fiber die Unterlagen des Staat-
ssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republic, (Stasi-unterlagen-
gesetz), vom. 20 Dezember 1991, BGB 1.1 S.2272; John Tagliabue, Files of East German Secret
Police Are Opened but Few Seek Access, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at A2.
The United States has also experienced repression and spying on the population. See Seth
F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets & Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in
Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) ("The sanctions at the command of Sena-
tor McCarthy, and his precursors and imitators, were primarily the ability to obtain and pub-
lish information."). For more on this unfortunate American tradition, see infra text
accompanying notes 322-324.
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but it can also be of service in thinking about autonomy. Kafka leaves
ambiguous the extent to which chance or terrible design determines how
information about K. is processed and shared. Certainly K. never knows
who is aware of his trial: "'So many people have connections with the
court!' said K. with his head sunken and led the manufacturer to the
writing table."' 2 4 K. is also ignorant of how the mysterious courts pro-
cess information. The explanations that K. receives cannot be of much
consolation to him. Should he receive a "seeming acquittal," for exam-
ple, his files will still be available to officials. Kafka writes, "Moreover,
[the dossier] remains in circulation. As required by the uninterrupted
commerce of the law bureaus, it is transmitted to the higher courts, re-
turned to the lower ones, and swings back and forth with larger and
smaller oscillations, with larger and smaller delays. These paths are in-
calculable." 205 There is no data protection in Kafka's world.
Kafka subtly probes the rage, passivity, and sense of impotence that
this situation engenders in K.20 6 K's ability to participate in social life is
ultimately destroyed by the way that bureaucracy treats him. In our
world, continuous observation of the AFDC participant's personal data
is achieved through data processing. By drastically expanding bureau-
cratic knowledge of the individual and by failing to explain where this
information will be utilized or how it will be used in decisionmaking, this
method of administration can weaken an individual's capacity for critical
reflection and participation in society.
C. Child Support Enforcement (CSE)
(1) Reasons for CSE's Reliance on the Data Processing Model: The National
Disgrace of Child Support
CSE, like AFDC, is managed by bureaucracies through the use of
computers that process personal information. Local child support en-
forcement units (CSEUs) are the new bureaucratic centers designed to
collect child support money. CSEUs utilize computers to locate funds
that custodial parents are entitled to receive, and to ensure that these
funds are actually transferred to them.207 The means of collecting child
204. KAFKA, supra note 120, at 116 (translated from original).
205. Id. at 136 (translated from original).
206. Consider, for example, the strange, passive relationship K. has with his lawyer. See
id. at 156. See generally Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent
in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384,
423-24 (1985) (discussing Kafka's depiction of the "central aspect of our nature": attraction to
authority rather than interest in maximizing autonomy).
207. The statutory provisions are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-65 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
For discussions of the background of the CSE program, see OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT EN-
support have been transformed as a result of the failure of the earlier
methods.
Under the old approach, the level of support for children was set by
court order. Thereafter, the noncustodial parent, who was and still is
usually the father, was obliged to write a check every month and send it
to the custodial parent.208 If this obligation was not met, the custodial
parent depended on judges, prosecutors, and her own attorney for en-
forcement of the child support order.209 A range of enforcement mecha-
nisms were available: sequestration and attachment of properties, a
contempt order from the divorce court, and criminal nonsupport pro-
ceedings.210 To allow these enforcement mechanisms to work across
state lines, a Uniform Act for Reciprocal Enforcement of Support was
passed by all fifty states by the end of the 1980s. 211.
Despite the measures that were available, the old approach did not
work; refusals to comply with child support awards occurred on a stag-
gering scale.212 Separate, detailed studies of child support by David
Chambers and Lenore Weitzman share the following findings: Middle
class fathers are as likely to fail to pay child support as less affluent fa-
thers; full compliance is not met by even half of the fathers ordered to
pay support; and a sizeable number of fathers never make a single pay-
ment of the court-ordered award.213 American children have been
robbed of billions of dollars as a result of noncompliance with support
orders. 21
4
Much evidence suggests that fathers have not paid their child sup-
port obligations because the legal system, despite its rhetoric, has treated
these duties as discretionary. The attitudes of judges, district attorneys
and even divorced women's counsel have been unsympathetic to di-
vorced women. 215 A reluctance to take the needs of children and women
FORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1-4 (1990) [hereinafter OCSE, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT].
208. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, 283-85 (1985).
209. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 32, at 233-37.
210. Id.
211. REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 393
(1987).
212. WEITZMAN, supra note 208, at 262-64; OCSE, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 207, at 5-7.
213. DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 105-62 (1979); see WEITZMAN, supra
note 208, at 262-310.
214. See OCSE, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 207, at 5 ("The total child
support payments for 1987 was reported to be only $10.0 billion, a shortfall of $4.6 billion or
32 percent.").
215. CHAMBERS, supra note 213, at 102-04; WEITZMAN, supra note 208, at 283-95; see
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 96 (1986) (noting "dismal judicial rec-
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seriously has been reflected in widespread refusal to apply the enforce-
ment mechanisms available. As the United States Department of Health
and Human Services has stated, "Child support enforcement will con-
tinue to be a problem until society expects and demands that parents
support their children and that all levels of government are thoroughly
committed to ensuring that children receive what they are due."
'216
This dismal picture may, however, be changing. The federal gov-
ernment has decided to use the computer's data processing capability to
set up a system of automatic withholding of child support. This system
relies on the social security number to locate noncustodial parents and
their money.
(2) Child Support Enforcement and the Computer
Collection of child support has been revolutionalized by reliance on
data processing. Over the last two decades, a series of laws has estab-
lished a web of interconnected data systems that monitor noncustodial
parents. The process began in 1974 with the Federal Child Support
Act,217 which created a parent locator service linked to similar services in
all the states. This cooperative effort seeks to find noncustodial parents
who fail to pay child support and whose families receive AFDC.218 In
1976, Congress explicitly authorized the use of social security numbers in
searches of federal and state data banks for information leading to the
location of these delinquent parents of AFDC families. 219 In 1982, Con-
gress granted these locator services access to IRS records to increase
their chances of locating absentee parents.220 Moreover, this law pro-
ord and the lethargic pace at which so many courts move"); Harry B. Krause, Child Support
Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT
THE CROSSROADS 166, 167-69 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna H. Kay eds., 1990) (in the
past, American law was "deeply insensitive to the enforcement of child support obligations").
216. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, DEP'T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (1984); see WEITZMAN, supra note 208, at 321
("[T]he current legal system places the economic responsibility for children on their mothers
and allows fathers the 'freedom' to choose not to support their children.").
217. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1988)).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1988).
219. Amendments Relating to Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 94-88, 89 Stat. 433 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1988)). This requirement was upheld in McElrath v. Califano,
615 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1980), and Chambers v. Klein, 419 F. Supp. 569 (D.N.J.), affid 564
F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977).
220. Ominibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990)).
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vides for the interception of tax refunds to help pay for overdue child
support in families that are eligible to receive AFDC.2 2 1
The next significant changes in child support enforcement were en-
acted in 1984. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
made the parent locator and enforcement services available to all fami-
lies-not merely those who receive AFDC.222 This law also requires em-
ployers to garnish the wages of absent parents whose child support
payments are in arrears in an amount greater than or equal to one
month's obligation. 223 Moreover, it orders states to issue guidelines that
set irrebuttable presumptions as to the level of child support awards, and
it provides for data matching and tax interception with the IRS for non-
AFDC families.22
4
The Family Support Act of 1988 is the latest example of the growing
trend of reliance on data processing to collect child support. As this
Article mentioned in its discussion of AFDC, this law requires all par-
ents to obtain a social security number for their child at birth.225 These
numbers are used to create a decentralized national data base that lists
the names and social security numbers of parents in conjunction with
those of their children. The purpose of these data banks is to improve
the government's ability to discover the identity and location of par-
ents.2 26 The FSA also uses data processing to broaden the range of infor-
mation used to determine the circumstances under which child support
will be withheld by the employer. 227 This part of the law goes into effect
in two steps.
Since late 1990 all employers have been required to withhold child
support from paychecks of employees if their families receive welfare
payments or if a CSEU has requested assistance in collecting child sup-
port due to a one-month arrearage of support.228 In 1994, all employers
221. Id.
222. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-373, 98 Stat. 1305
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
223. 42 U.S.C. §§ 503(e), 666(b)(6)(A) (1988).
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 664, 667 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2)(C) (1988); see 6 PRIVACY J., Apr. 1990, at 1 (although law
states "[s]uch numbers shall not be recorded on the birth certificate," Department of Health
and Human Services plans to issue advisory statement saying prohibition applies only to copies
of birth certificate).
226. See SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 144, at 23 ("The social security
number is a major tool in tracing absent parents and enforcing the collection of child support.
This provision will establish as a norm the furnishing of the parents' social security numbers at
the time of birth.").
227. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1988); see 45 C.F.R. § 95.601 (1991) (providing for federal finan-
cial participation in the funding of automatic data processing equipment and services).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(3) (1988).
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will automatically withhold child support payments from the noncus-
todial parent's paycheck unless both parents have agreed to opt out of
the system.229 Having already greatly increased the government's on-line
data base, the federal data bank of parental names and social security
numbers is intended to ensure that this withholding is carried out. In the
words of one state's director of Child Support Enforcement, "Some peo-
ple would say that's Big Brotherism. Well, it is.
''23
A glance at a computer screen at a CSEU provides prima facie sup-
port for the allusion to Big Brother. The "Absent Parent" screen (which
is informally known in the Fayetteville, Arkansas CSEU office as the
"Papa Screen") lists all case information, the social security number and
address of the absent parent, the source for the address, and the em-
ployer's address. 231 This screen can also be used to access the following:
Court data; information on payments in arrears; internal data relating to
case management; all information at the AFDC office; and, thus, all data
sharing and matching listed in Table A, infra.232 Moreover, the CSEU
also has access to the "Federal Parent Locator" database.
233
The "Federal Parent Locator" database can be called up by the
CSEU from the "Absent Parent" screen.234 A sample Parent Locator
screen, as it appears to a clerk at a CSEU, is reproduced in Table B.
235
The Parent Locator database contains information from the following:
the Social Security Administration; the Department of Defense; the Vet-
erans Administration; the Motor Vehicle Bureau of the state in which the
CSEU is located; the IRS, including 1099 forms; and commercial credit
bureaus. 236 The parent locator also allows searches of state data bases,
three states at a time.2
37
Once the address or employer of an absentee parent shows up on a
computer screen at the CSEU, the enforcement starts. The local enforce-
ment unit's first step is to notify the absentee parent that wage withhold-
229. Id § 666(a)(8).
230. Jerrold Brockmyre, Director, Michigan Office of Child Support Enforcement, quoted
in Nancy Herndon, Garnish. Dad, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 28, 1988, at 25.
231. ARKANSAS CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ARKANSAS DEP'T HUMAN SERVS.,
AUTOMATED DATA SYSTEM USER'S MANUAL §§ 5000-5500g (1989) [hereinafter CSE USER'S
MANUAL] (on file with author).
232. Id §§ 4000-4019, 5000-5009.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
234. ARKANSAS CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ARKANSAS DEP'T. HUMAN SERVS.,
POLICY FOR THE CHILD SUPPORT PROGRAM § 1202 (1991) (on file with author); CSE USERS
MANUAL, supra note 231, §§ 8000-8001.
235. See infra page 1389.
236. CSE USERS MANUAL, supra note 231, §§ 8000-01.
237. Id. § 8001.
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ing will take effect and to offer an opportunity to contest such
withholding.238 The unit then sends this parent's employer an order to
withhold wages.239 The employer must deduct the money from the par-
ent's wages and pay it to the CSEU, which either passes it on to the
family or, in the cases of AFDC recipients, turns all but the first fifty
dollars over to the federal government. 24
There are two significant safeguards against possible ill effects of this
data processing. First, in order to guard against the possibility that
either the wrong person's wages might be withheld or the wrong amount
might be deducted, noncustodial parents are notified before withhold-
ing.241 Second, the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
protect against employer reprisals by requiring that state law provide for
the fining of any employer "who discharges from employment, refuses to
employ, or takes disciplinary action against any absent parent subject to
wage withholding ... because of the existence of such withholding and
the obligations or additional obligations which it imposes upon the
employer. '24
2
The congressional goal in coupling automatic withholding with ob-
jective mandatory standards is to increase compliance with court-ordered
child support. Congress believes that technology can play an important
role in solving a complex social problem, indeed a national tragedy: the
irresponsibility of many fathers toward their offspring. Congress has re-
sponded by passing the Family Support Act and related laws. Underly-
ing these laws is the presumption that ever larger groups of noncustodial
parents will neglect to pay child support and that technology is the best
means of preventing this pattern of behavior.
(3) Effects on Bureaucratic Justice and Autonomy
This section begins by examining differences in the nature of AFDC
and CSE and in the tasks that the computer performs in these programs.
This comparison leads to an evaluation of the effect of CSE's use of data
processing on bureaucratic justice and autonomy. This analysis will, in
turn, suggest ways in which the impact of data processing is affected by
its context.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(4)(A) (1988).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(6)(A)(i) (1988).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 657(b) (1988).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(4)(A) (1988).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(6)(D) (1988). The required provision is codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-14-226 (Michie 1987).
[Vol. 43
July 1992] DATA PROCESSING AND GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 1371
There are significant differences between AFDC and CSE. CSE is a
debt collection program; it represents an attempt by the government to
collect the money that noncustodial parents owe their families. In con-
trast, AFDC is a government entitlement program; as the Supreme
Court has noted, AFDC provides "the very means by which to live."
'243
As a result of this role, AFDC serves important interests for both the
recipient ("the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and
medical care") and for the state (by providing the poor with an opportu-
nity to "participate meaningfully in the life of the community" and by
guarding "against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread
sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity"). 244 The danger of domi-
nating the recipient and the risk of unjust administration are of particular
concern with AFDC due to the significance of the program to its target
population.
Not only are AFDC and CSE different kinds of governmental pro-
grams, but they also apply the computer to different tasks. AFDC's data
processing determines eligibility for an important governmental entitle-
ment sought by a vulnerable population. In contrast, CSE uses the com-
puter to collect money. More precisely, a CSEU computer processes
data to locate the noncustodial parent and his employer, to give notifica-
tion to this parent before withholding, and to order the employer to de-
duct the required amount of child support from each paycheck.
245
While the computer's application in AFDC poses dangers to a vulnerable
group, its use in CSE keeps noncustodial parents from acting unjustly
toward their children and former spouses. Hence, a comparison of the
contexts of data processing in these two programs leads one to expect
greater dangers from the computer's application in the administration of
AFDC than from its application in the administration of CSE.
Indeed, it is possible to be initially optimistic about the impact of
CSE on the first two elements of bureaucratic justice-accuracy and effi-
ciency. It is easier to measure accuracy in relation to the enforcement of
child support orders than in determining eligibility for welfare. In
AFDC, the computer processes a wide range of data to assist in making a
complex judgment about the needs of the applicant. By contrast, in CSE
the computer simply finds the right person and collects the right amount.
Accuracy is protected in CSE by notifying the noncustodial parents
243. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
244. IkL at 264-65.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
before withholding begins. Moreover, outside audits of state CSE pro-
grams are mandated by federal law. 246
In terms of efficiency, automatic withholding clearly has increased
the amount of child support collected. The figures are impressive. Over
the last five years for which full data is available, state units have almost
doubled the amount of money collected each year. This represents an
increase from 3.2 billion dollars in 1986 to 6.0 billion dollars in 1990.247
CSE's cost efficiency increases every year. Current figures indicate that
almost four dollars are now collected for every dollar spent on program
administration. 248 CSE is a government program that helps the needy
and saves tax dollars.
There is one phenomenon associated with CSE, however, that un-
dercuts its efficiency. Federal and state law do not adequately protect the
employment of the noncustodial parent. Upon receipt of a withholding
notice, some employers simply fire a noncustodial parent rather than sub-
jecting his or her wages to withholding.249 There are two possible expla-
nations for this unintended result of CSE: the stigma associated with
wage withholding, and the administrative costs that withholding imposes
on the employer. This Article will return to these two issues later.250
The application of the computer in collecting child support thus
generally satisfies concern for accuracy and efficiency, but the danger of
this current application of data processing is that it may sometimes lead
to an unjust termination of the noncustodial parent's employment. The
third element of bureaucratic justice, the dignity interest, is clearly af-
fected by such an unjust termination of employment. Moreover, the non-
custodial parent's lack of kmowledge as to how personal data is used in
the process of wage withholding further undermines the dignity interest.
The preceding analysis of AFDC discussed how a mysterious, unex-
plained process can humiliate and bewilder program participants. In
CSE, the same potential exists. Notice of withholding is given to the
noncustodial parent, 251 but no notice is provided as to how the CSEU
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 653, 654, 666 (1988).
247. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T & HEALTH HUMAN
SERVS., FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (1992).
248. Id. at 12.
249. See, e.g., Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, 551 N.E.2d 981, 987
(Ohio 1990) (at-will employment relationship terminated by an employer solely because of a
court-ordered child support wage assignment of the employee's wages); Sue Shellenbarger,
Work & Family: Child-Support Rules Shake Parents, Firms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1992, at BI
(big firms see withholding rules as a burden, and "[s]ome small firms are rebelling" against
these rules).
250. See infra text accompanying notes 312-315.
251. See supra text accompanying note 241.
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will apply the vast amounts of data to which it has access. Adding to the
potential bewilderment of noncustodial parents, individual states vary in
the extent to which they share wage withholding information with com-
mercial credit bureaus.
252
The processing of data in CSE not only generates several unintended
effects on the efficiency and dignity elements of bureaucratic justice; it
may also have an impact on human autonomy. To be sure, the com-
puters at a CSEU influence the choices of noncustodial parents: choices
as to payment of child support, and even choices regarding the formation
of a new family. But autonomy, as we have seen, can withstand restric-
tions on external choices. The danger to autonomy arises in the CSE
program only if CSE impairs that capacity for critical thought on which
social participation depends.
253
The greatest threat to autonomy posed by CSE derives from the ig-
norance of noncustodial parents as to where and how information about
them is stored and shared. Noncustodial parents receive notice of with-
holding, but they do not know the extent of the government's knowledge
of their family and their financial obligations. This Article has cited a
government official's comparison of CSE with Big Brother. But in
Orwell's grim world, one knew where he or she stood with Big Brother:
Big Brother's rule was made possible by the continuous gathering and
application of information about the individual. In that world, all was
known about everyone: "Nothing was your own except the few cubic
centimeters inside your skull. 254 By contrast, noncustodial parents who
are subject to CSE remain ignorant as to the use of the data compiled
about them.
In both AFDC and CSE, applying the computer can interfere with
the achievement of governmental objectives and erode individual self-de-
252. The 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments require that states respond to
requests from credit bureaus by supplying them with past-due child support information. 42
U.S.C. § 666(a)(7) (1988). See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (1989)
(although all states required to respond to requests for credit information, Federal Office of
Child Support Enforcement encourages states "to establish routine reporting systems with the
national consumer credit bureau reporting network"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-14-209(b)
(Michie 1987) ("Upon written request by a consumer reporting agency, the Child Support
Enforcement Unit may make information available to the agency regarding an amount of over-
due support owed by a noncustodial parent.").
253. See supra text accompanying notes 130-137.
254. ORWELL, supra note 200, at 25. Orwell's prophecy as to loss of privacy is one of the
most widely discussed aspects of his novel. See, eg., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466-67
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980);
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 210 (1967); Ruth Leuze, Orwells "1984"-Utopie
oder reale Gefahr?, 99 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLArTT 1 (1984).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
termination. Americans no longer know how their personal information
will be applied, who will gain access to it, and what decisions will be
made with it. The resulting uncertainty increases pressure for conform-
ity. Individuals whose personal data are shared, processed and stored by
a mysterious, incalculable bureaucracy will be more likely to act as the
government wishes them to behave. The preceding analysis suggests the
need to develop a systematic legal approach to furthering bureaucratic
justice and protecting autonomy. Part III of this Article develops such
principles in an attempt to establish the basis of an American data pro-
tection law.
III. What Should the Law Do?
This Article has relied on notions of bureaucratic justice and auton-
omy to evaluate data processing systems in AFDC and CSE. Building
on this analysis, this Article now develops the elements of an American
data protection law that would be capable of institutionalizing respect for
these norms throughout the American administrative state.
A. Structuring Bureaucratic Justice and Protecting Autonomy: The RoIe of
Data Protection Law
The state's service administration depends on data processing. Yet
the treatment of information as a flow, as we have encountered in our
examination of AFDC and CSE, has a profound, and sometimes pro-
foundly negative, effect on bureaucratic justice and autonomy. This con-
clusion is consistent with a developing school of administrative law
scholarship that emphasizes the importance of agency structure and gov-
ernance. This approach focuses on aspects of "internal" administrative
practices. 255 In the spirit of this approach, this Article argues that
American law must reflect an awareness of how the flow of personal in-
formation in the government affects bureaucracy and human behavior.
In other Western nations, substantial attention paid to this issue is
considered part of a distinct area of law called data protection law.
256
The name is somewhat of a misnomer. Data protection law does not
merely seek to guard data, but also attempts to safeguard the individual's
interests.25 7 It counters the computer's omniscience with an ongoing
255. See supra text accompanying note 2.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
257. Attempts to guard data are usually called "data security." Schwartz, supra note 4, at
153.
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compromise between the concealment and exposure of personal
information.
25s
There are many ways to structure this compromise, but no nation
has based it on an absolute individual right to control one's personal
data.25 9 Such a right of control, which might be fashioned as a quasi-
property right, would do more harm than good. As a private person, the
individual may wish to have exclusive authority over who has access to
data that refers to him or her. But as a citizen, he or she also wishes to
be aware of the activities of the nation's leaders, of other prominent
figures, and of ordinary people who are associated with newsworthy
events.260 Furthermore, the citizen has an interest in the accurate and
efficient distribution of benefits and services by the activist state's service
administration. 261 These concerns militate against a law allowing the
data subject exclusive control of the image of societal reality expressed in
"his" or "her" personal data.262
Rather than promoting an absolute right of personal control, an
American data protection law should be organized around three ele-
ments: The maintenance of transparent information processing systems,
the assignment of limited procedural and substantive rights to the data
subject, and the establishment of independent monitoring of the process-
ing of data. Different risks will arise depending on the area of life being
subjected to administration; therefore, these elements must be set forth in
both a general data protection law (providing a safety net in an age of
technological change) and specific laws directed at discrete data sys-
tems. 263 The first two elements of data protection law, the development
of a concept of transparency and the assignment of limited procedural
and substantive rights, are discussed in the next section.
258. Simitis, Reviewing Privacy, supra note 81, at 730-32.
259. For discussions of the kinds of compromises reached, see FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at
359-407, and Schwartz, supra note 4, at 694-701; See also 65 BVerfGE 42-44 (1985) (declara-
tion by German Constitutional Court that "the individual does not have a right in the sense of
an absolute, unlimitable mastery over 'his' data; he is rather a personality that develops within
a social community and is dependent upon communication.") (translated from original); Fried,
supra note 199, at 486 ("In concrete situations and actual societies, control over information
about oneself, like control over one's bodily security or property, can only be relative and
qualified.").
260. These interests are protected by the first amendment-more or less adequately. See
supra text accompanying note 97.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
262. Simitis, Reviewing Privacy, supra note 81, at 737.
263. For discussion of the significance of the interplay between general and specific laws,
see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 153 and Simitis, German Data Protection Law Commentary,
supra note 3, at 85-86.
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B. Creating Transparent Systems and Assigning Limited Procedural and
Substantive Rights
The creation of transparent systems of data processing updates a
traditional American belief in open government. In the words of James
Madison, "A popular government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or per-
haps both." 264 The principle of transparency depends on more, however,
than providing such "popular information." That task is carried out by
the Freedom of Information Act 265 and the Government in the Sunshine
Act;266 these laws provide a right of access to information in the control
of government bureaucracy 267 and a right of attendance at the delibera-
tions of government agencies. 26 In contrast, transparency requires a
structuring of the bureaucratic systems that process personal information
in order to set limits on these systems and to make them open and under-
standable to the data subject.269 Transparency also requires assigning
limited procedural and substantive rights to the data subject to further
the dignity component of bureaucratic justice and to promote autonomy.
These rights would allow data subjects to demand understandable expla-
nations of how decisions were made, and to object to systems of data
processing that adversely affect their capacity for decisionmaking.2
70
264. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1816-1828, at 276, 276 (1865).
265. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990)).
266. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
267. See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976) (Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) reflects "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure") (quoting S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965)). But see HERBERT MITGANG, DANGEROUS Dos-
SIERS: EXPOSING THE SECRET WAR AGAINST AMERICA'S GREATEST AUTHORS 154-55
(1988) (more delay and stonewalling during the Reagan presidency than before in responses to
FOIA requests); NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN, CIZEN COHN 465 (1988) (FOIA is "a dead
letter: Although the Roy Cohn FBI file is over 4,000 pages, more than a year after the man's
death virtually nothing but Xerox copies of a few newspaper articles have been released.");
Diana M.T.K. Autin, The Reagan Administration and the Freedom of Information Act, in
FREEDOM AT RISK 69 (Richard 0. Curry ed., 1988) (noting restrictive attitude of Reagan
administration towards freedom of information); Educators Assail U.S. Curbs on Access to
Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1988, at B9 (too much information is classified and at higher
levels than is warranted); Andrew Blum, Freedom to Battle for Data, NAT'L. L.J., Mar. 12,
1990, at 1 (significant problems with administration of FOIA).
268. See FCC v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. 463, 469-71 (1984) (Sunshine Act
applies to meetings where at least a quorum of agency's members conduct or dispose of official
agency business).
269. This concept has been raised to a constitutional obligation in the Federal Republic of
Germany. See 65 BVfGE 1 (1985); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 686-94.
270. See 65 BVfGE 1, 62-63 (1985) (discussion by German Constitutional Court of "com-
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Germany's Constitutional Court articulated aspects of these ideas in
its ground-breaking Census decision.271 The Census opinion identified a
"right of informational self-determination" that has two aspects which
are relevant to our discussion. The first is the obligation that this right
places on the state to organize data processing so that the data subject
can anticipate who will use his or her personal data and the purposes for
which this information will be used.27 2 Declaring its goal in dramatic
terms, the German Court stated: "Inconsistent with the right of infor-
mational self-determination would be a societal order and assisting legal
order in which the citizen no longer knew the who, what, when and how
of knowledge about him. ' 273 This right also prevents any use of personal
data that is sufficiently intrusive or coercive to destroy the individual's
capacity for self-government.2 74 This aspect of the right places a duty on
the state to carry out data processing in a fashion that respects the auton-
omy of the individual. 275
Such an approach obliges legislative and administrative bodies to
create open and understandable data systems and to evaluate whether
these systems respect the self-determination of the individual.2 76 In Ger-
many, this evaluation has also been carried out by the judiciary as part of
a sophisticated, ongoing public discussion and political debate. 277
Although application of the idea of "informational self-determination"
has not been without difficulties,278 Germany's attempt to realize this
mand of clearness of norms" in data processing systems); PRIVACY STUDY REPORT, supra
note 40, at 506-16 (discussion of disclosure limitations and the value of openness).
271. 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983). An English translation of excerpts from this case with excel-
lent commentary is found in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 332-36 (1989).
272. 65 BVerfGE at 46.
273. Id. at 42-43 (translated from original).
274. Id
275. Id at 44.
276. Id at 46. For discussion of this aspect of the decision, see Spiros Simitis, Die In-
formationelle Selbstbestimmung-Grundbedingung einer verfassungskonformen Information-
sordnung, 37 NJW 398 (1984); Erhard Denninger, Das Recht auf informationelle
Selbstbestimmung und Innere Sicherheit, 18 KRrrISCHE JUSTIZ 215 (1985).
277. For German judicial decisions that consider whether data systems respect the self-
determination of the individual, see, e.g., BVfG, 4 RDV 194 (1988); BVfG, 2 RDV 76 (1988)
BVfG, 40 NJW 2805 (1987); Verwaltungsgericht, Frankfurt-am-Main, 4 RDV 209 (1988).
For a sampling of the public discussion and political debate, see, e.g., VERDATET UND
VERNETZT (Wilhelm Steinmueller ed., 1988); VOLKSZXHLUNG VERZAHLT (Jiirgen Arnold &
Jutta Schneider eds., 1988).
278. See, e.g., Bizer & Rofinagel, supra note 89, at 445-48; Spiros Simitis & Gerhard
Fuckner, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung und "staatliches Geheimhaltungsinteresse," 43
NJW 2713 (1990); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 698-701.
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norm shows that seeking transparency is an excellent start to making
data protection an important part of a nation's legal and political agenda.
In America, realization of the idea of transparency requires similar
legislative and administrative action. The legislature and administration
must seek to make governmental data processing systems open and un-
derstandable. Achieving this goal begins with the articulation of limited,
precise goals prior to the collection, processing, or sharing of personal
data.279 Such goals, as we have seen, have been at best incompletely ex-
pressed in AFDC and CSE.280 Transparency also requires that the data
subject be given notice of the extent of the collection, processing, and
sharing of personal data. As the preceding analysis indicates, this notice
is far from adequate at present in AFDC and CSE.281 Even when impor-
tant public concerns require limitations to be placed on the principle of
transparency, as in the case of data pertaining to national security, re-
strictions should still be set on data processing systems.
The realization of the second fundamental element of an American
data protection law, the assignment of procedural and substantive rights
to the data subject, also begins with legislative and administrative action.
This action should create rights that require the state to explain the goals
and functioning of data processing systems. Notice also plays an impor-
tant role here. The state should be obliged to inform data subjects of
whether they are required to supply information to the organization that
seeks it, where information about them will be used, and whether they
can inspect and request correction of this data.282 Rights that guarantee
this kind of notice do not exist within AFDC and CSE.283 By allowing
279. Such a requirement has been mandated in Germany. See 65 BVfGE 50; Simitis, Ger-
man Data Protection Law Commentary, supra note 3, at 70-85.
In America, the government's collection, processing and sharing of data is currently de-
cided "in a low profile, ad hoc fashion by a variety of government bodies." Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 695.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 159-254.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 159-254.
282. See PRIVACY STUDY REPORT, supra note 40, at 462-63 (Federal Privacy Protection
Study Commission proposes similar requirements for clients of public assistance and social
service programs).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 184-186, 251-252. The Privacy Act, which articu-
lates rules for the employment of personal information by the federal government, does con-
tain notice provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3) (Supp. 11 1990). But the Privacy Act has not
created effective notice of federal data use. See FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 341. In a trio of
recent cases, federal appellate courts have objected to some of the agency practices that have
reduced the Privacy Act to irrelevancy. In the first of these cases, the District of Columbia
Circuit gave strength to the Privacy Act's requirement that agencies collect information first
from the data subject. Waters v. Thornburgh, 888 F.2d 870, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In the
other two cases, the Third and Ninth Circuits attempted to narrow the "routine use" exemp-
tion to the Privacy Act's requirement that the data subject's consent be acquired before infor-
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knowledge of the who, what, why, when, and how of the processing of
one's personal information, these rights would serve to protect dignity
and autonomy.
Processing of data in a procedurally adequate fashion may still at
times impinge upon human autonomy. Such instances will require evalu-
ations of competing values to determine the extent to which individual
rights will be protected. To make this determination, the legislature, ex-
ecutive, and judiciary must explicate social norms, examine the effects of
data processing systems, and analyze constitutional principles. In doing
so, they must seek to develop a scale of values with which to evaluate
self-determination and the informational interests of state and society. 284
Section III.D of this Article further explores necessary improvements in
AFDC and CSE. Before turning to these matters, this Article will ex-
plore the final element of data protection law: The establishment of in-
dependent monitoring of the processing of data.
C. Creating Independent Oversight
Protection of bureaucratic justice and autonomy requires a structur-
ing of information processing and the assignment of limited procedural
and substantive rights to the data subject. But transforming the informa-
tion processing within government agencies requires the assistance of an
institution capable of offering independent expertise. This, in turn, re-
quires the establishment of a government body capable of studying the
effects and implications of data processing practices. 28 5 This institution
would achieve the third goal of an American data protection law by
monitoring bureaucracy's data processing, as well as technological and
mation collected for one purpose can be used for another. Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv.,
886 F.2d 544, 549-50 (3d Cir. 1989); Covert v. Harrington, 876 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1989).
It is too early to tell if these cases will increase the respect paid to the Privacy Act. The
limited nature of the remedies offered by this Act reduces the importance of the procedural
and substantive interests that the Privacy Act assigns to the data subject. Under the Privacy
Act, a federal court has limited authority. It can only provide the data subject with access to
his or her records, amend inaccurate records, and under limited circumstances, pay money to
injured parties. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(l)-(2)(A) (1988); Edison v. Department of the Army, 672
F.2d 840 (11th Cir. 1982); Hanley v. Department of Justice, 623 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1980).
Under the current interpretation of the Privacy Act, the federal govenment may keep its prac-
tices unaltered and litigate the occasional claim. The ineffectiveness of the Privacy Act indi-
cates the need for improvements in the domain-specific regulation of agency practices in such
areas as AFDC and CSE.
284. T. Alexander Alenikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 973 (1987).
285. See FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 305 ("The United States carries out data protection
differently than other countries, and on the whole does it less well, because of the lack of an
oversight agency.").
international legal developments. In its attempt to protect human auton-
omy, data protection law can remain effective and current only if such an
institution exists to assist government bureaucracy, the legislature, and
the data subject.
Congress's difficulty in understanding the organization and struc-
ture of data processing within federal agencies supports this proposition.
An official admission of this difficulty has been expressed in the context
of oversight of the Social Security Administration. The Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, the research arm of Congress, has enumerated some
of the reasons why Congress does not understand how this vast bureau-
cracy processes personal information:
[I]n the long term, oversight becomes more difficult because adminis-
trative decisions become more highly technical and involve issues of
technological capacity, multi-year investments, and systems manage-
ment strategy that laymen-which includes most congressional repre-
sentatives and their staff-find difficult to understand. Seeking and
comparing the judgments of technical experts and working to compre-
hend these evaluations is extremely demanding of time, effort, and at-
tention; it is all the more difficult because systems experts constitute a
highly concentrated community of people with a great many poten-
tially overlapping vested interests in the actions of [the Social Security
Administration], a major purchaser of computer systems.286
This statement exposes one of democracy's most difficult challenges in
the twentieth century: managing an often unfathomable government bu-
reaucracy. 287 A critical facet of this task is overseeing bureaucracy's data
processing systems.
In the absence of extensive expert assistance, the legislature has been
overwhelmed by the task of understanding data processing systems
within the service administration. Without such expertise, the com-
puter's seeming precision has led the legislature to overestimate the com-
puter's power and to ignore its limitations.288 And if the "laymen" in
Congress are unable to understand data processing systems within gov-
ernment bureaucracy, the ordinary citizen has no hope of comprehen-
sion. Data subjects are unlikely to have the resources and technical
expertise to understand the arrangement of information processing, the
286. SOCIAL SECURITY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 164, at 58.
287. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CON-
GRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 185 (1988) (diffi-
culty in congressional oversight of agency action due to legislature's inability to shape its sense
of appropriate policies); SOCIAL SECURITY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 164, at 1 ("[E]jiective
oversight and monitoring of agencies dependent on advanced information systems is becoming
more difficult, as technological decisionmaking and management increasingly requires special
knowledge.").
288. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 177-180.
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employment of their personal data, and the extent of their rights. 28 9 The
necessary help is not likely to come from individual federal agencies,
which have no incentive to act as public ombudsmen or to engage in self-
criticism.
290
Although government bureaucracy now relies on data processing,
there are almost no federal officials who are able to devote time to devel-
oping necessary expertise in the regulation of data processing.291 In the
1938 Storrs Lecture on Jurisprudence, James Landis observed that the
problem of expertise lies at the heart of the administrative process.292
His words are more relevant today than ever. Landis stated that exper-
tise "springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability and desire
to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to a particular
problem." 29
3
The chief role of an American data protection commission would be
to assist the government and citizens in understanding the effects and
implications of data processing practices. This role would be carried out
by monitoring data processing practices and compliance with laws, by
drawing the attention of the legislature and the public to the problems of
existing laws and the need for further regulation, and by assisting citizens
seeking to protect their interests and exercise their rights.294 By fulfilling
these tasks, the data protection commission would help to ensure that the
legislature and public remain aware and active as the conflicts generated
by information processing systems change.295 Data protection law can
represent no more than an ongoing response to an evolving situation.
An American data protection commission would also monitor inter-
national agreements and foreign laws that affect data imports and ex-
ports. Internationalization of business has brought with it an
289. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 139-42; Simitis, Reviewing PH-
vacy, supra note 81, at 742-46.
290. See PRIVACY STUDY REPORT, supra note 40, at 532 ("Within agencies, there has
often been little or no compliance monitoring, as well as no office to which agency operating
personnel can turn for guidance.").
291. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 315-18 (at best, there is an "informal network of data
protection officials" who, "it must be admitted.... have limited power").
292. JAiES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 22-42 (1938).
293. Id at 23.
294. For analysis of the activities of a data protection commission, see FLAHERTY, supra
note 3, at 371-407; Ulrich Damman, § 18, § 19, § 20, in German Data Protection Law Com-
mentary, supra note 3, at 577-613.
295. FLAHERTY, supra note 3; Dammann, supra note 294, at 608-14; see, e.g.,
BUNDESBEAUFrRAGTEN FOR DEN DATENSCHUTZ, supra note 44, at 89-93 (joint resolutions
of German Federal and State data protection commissioners as to data protection in hospitals,
planned changes in the federal data protection law, and a proposal for a legal regulation of
telecommunications).
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internationalization of data flows, as well as global attention to data pro-
tection issues.296 But this international attention currently lacks signifi-
cant American participation. As a result, documents such as the Council
of Europe's Data Protection Convention can be used as weapons to block
data exports to the United States.297 This internationally binding agree-
ment, which has been signed by eighteen European countries, allows sig-
natory nations to prevent the export of data to nations that do not offer
"equivalent protections" for personal information.298 Data exports to
America have already been prevented under this standard.299 The
United States must do more than fight for a principle of free international
data flows; it must develop the institutional expertise that will allow in-
volvement in the worldwide debate over data protection concerns. 300
296. There is even a periodical devoted entirely to the issues raised in regulating these data
flows: the Transnational Data Report and Communication (TDR). See Resolutions of the 11th
Conference of Data Protection Commissioners, 12 TDR No. 9, at 33 (Berlin, August 30, 1989)
("International data networks are increasingly used for transfers of personal data, for instance
in the use of credit cards, for the purposes of travel booking systems and within multinational
enterprises."); see also Steve Lohr, The Growth of the Global Office, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1988,
at D1 (American service industries increasingly send data to foreign countries to be processed);
MICHEL BERGMANN, GRENZOBERSCHREITENDES DATENSCHUTZ (1985) (analysis of data
protection laws that regulate international data flows).
297. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, No. 108.
298. Id. at Ch. II, 3(a).
299. The evidence is, however, sketchy. See, eg., Dieter Baumeister, Grenzdberschrei-
tender Datentransfer und Datenschutz im nichtdffentlichen Bereich aus der Sicht der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 6 RDV 23, 24 (1990) (German data protection authorities re-
fused to let a large enterprise transfer its data processing work to a branch office in the United
States because of lack of American regulations that correspond to German protections). The
paucity of the evidence is not surprising since the decision as to "equivalency" of protection is
left to each nation that has signed the Convention. BERGMANN, supra note 296, at 189.
The European Community has now prepared a draft directive relating to data protection
that will allow "Member States" to transfer personal data "only if that country ensures an
adequate level of protection." Commission Proposal for Council Directive Concerning the
Protection of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, Ch. VIII (Sept. 13,
1990). See John Markoff, Europe's Plans to Protect Privacy Worry Business, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
11, 1991, at Al (many American companies fear new rules of European Community could
limit their use of computer data); PRIVACY TIMES, Nov. 21, 1990, at 3-4 (United States fits
"squarely into the definition of countries lacking equivalent privacy protection" and "[s]ome
U.S. Corporations are concerned that the provision, if eventually adopted, could become a
non-economic trade barrier."); Alfred Einwag, Grenzziberschreitender Datenverkehr aus Sicht
des Bundesbeauftragtenfdir den Datenschutz 6 RDV 1, 2 (1990) (German Federal Data Pro-
tection Commission argues that it is to be assumed that the transfer of personal data into a
country with no or a significantly lower level of data protection harms important interests of
the individual).
300. See Data Protection, Computers, and Changing Information Practices: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Gov't Info., Justice, and Agria of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearings] (opening statement of Rep.
[Vol. 43
July 1992] DATA PROCESSING AND GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 1383
Although the United States is almost alone among Western nations
in its failure to create an institution with such expertise, there is aware-
ness even in America of the potential value of such a commission. This
recognition dates back to the discussions that led to the Privacy Act of
1974. At that time, Senator Sam Ervin introduced a bill to create a Fed-
eral Privacy Board.301 Senator Ervin pointed to the urgent need for
"foresight and the ability to forecast the possible trends in information
technology and the information policies of our government and private
organizations before they actually take their toll."130 2 Ervin's proposed
Federal Privacy Board was to oversee the gathering and disclosure of
personal information by "[flederal agencies, state and local governments,
and private organizations. ' 30 3 Unfortunately, opposition from the Ford
administration prevented this bill from becoming law.
3°4
In the last Congress, two bills sought to establish this kind of in-
dependent oversight.30 5 In support of the Data Protection Act of 1989,
Representative Robert Wise stated:
We need a Data Protection Board principally because there is no voice
in Government that represents and articulates data protection con-
cerns on an ongoing basis. In the balancing of interests that shape
Government policies and actions, data protection needs are frequently
ignored because there [are] no institutional spokesmen to represent
them.30
6
Despite the efforts of Representative Wise and the House Committee on
Government Information, neither of the current data protection bills has
made its way out of committee.30
7
Although international experience indicates that data protection
commissions can entail relatively modest costs, Congress is not currently
Wise) (discussing need for United States to develop agency devoted to privacy to help protect
American "international influence, business opportunities, and jobs").
301. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in U.S. Congress,
Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, 3-8 (1976) (remarks of Senator Ervin introduc-
ing a bill to establish a Federal Privacy Board).
302. Id. at 5.
303. The bill is reprinted at id, 9-28.
304. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 311-14. See KENNETH C. LAUDON, DOSSIER SOCIETY:
VALUE CHOICES IN THE DESIGN OF NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5-6 (1986) (discuss-
ing the "choice opportunity" lost in failure to create a Privacy Protection Commission).
305. H.R. 3669, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H8704-05 (daily ed. Nov. 15,
1989); H.R. 126, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H49 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1989).
306. 135 CONG. REC. H8704 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1989) (remarks by Rep. Wise). Represen-
tative Wise reintroduced this Bill in the current congress. H.R. 685, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 137
CONG. REC. H755 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991).
307. See House Hearings, supra note 300, at 3 (opening statement of Rep. Wise) (discuss-
ing Data Protection Board Bill and admitting it "may not be on the fast track in this session of
Congress").
in the mood to create new government institutions. 30o Landis was also
insightful on this score:
The most superficial criticism which can be directed toward the devel-
opment of the administrative process is that which bases its objections
merely upon numerical growth.... Efficiency in the processes of gov-
ernmental regulation is best served by the creation of more rather than
less agencies. And it is efficiency that is the desperate need.309
The creation of an American data protection commission would dramati-
cally improve the quality of federal regulation of government agencies'
use of information.
D. Concluding Thoughts About AFDC and CSE
The principles of transparency, assignment of rights to the data sub-
ject, and independent monitoring are not merely general principles:
They have a particular place in the legal organization of specific data
processing programs. Having discussed the shortcomings of data
processing in AFDC and CSE, this Article will now indicate how the
three principles of data protection law can be used to improve adminis-
tration of these programs.
One criticism of data use in AFDC and CSE is that administrators
of these programs do not adequately inform the applicant and beneficiary
of how personal information is processed and shared.310 If there is to be
transparency in these governmental programs, this knowledge must be
provided. It should be structured through an actual notice requirement.
A written component to this notice should be presumed necessary. This
component is to be supplemented by oral explanations reasonably
designed to inform the citizen of the details of knowledge about him. To
the extent that program-specific data protection law increases the sub-
ject's understanding of the state's use of information, it lessens the risk of
domination by the state.311
The danger of state domination can also be lessened by the assign-
ment of procedural and substantive rights to the data subject in the
AFDC and CSE programs. These rights should insure notice of data
processing practices. In addition, data subjects should be encouraged to
find out the contents of their records. AFDC and CSE offices should
consider providing data subjects with regular printouts of "account activ-
308. The Ford administration's opposition to the proposal of a federal privacy board in
1974 was also based on the belief that growth of government should be opposed. See FLA-
HERTY, supra note 3, at 311-12.
309. LANDIS, supra note 292, at 24.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 173; 251-252.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 193-206.
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ity." The computer's awesome data processing capabilities need not cre-
ate only confusion. On the contrary, computer systems should be
designed to provide individualized insight into the functioning of govern-
ment bureaucracy.
In CSE, rights should be created to prevent unjust terminations. As
noted earlier, some employers react to a wage withholding order by firing
the noncustodial parent.312 The message that the CSE computer appears
to be sending to some employers is that particular employees lack credit
or moral worthiness. Demanding that an employer withhold wages may
lead that employer to believe that the noncustodial parent should lose his
job because he is someone who does not pay his debts or fulfill his social
obligations.313 Federal law currently provides only for fining the em-
ployer who fires an employee for child support delinquency. 314 The non-
custodial parent should also be able to obtain reinstatement and back
wages. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with this
proposition and developed a public policy exception to the state's em-
ployment at will doctrine.
315
Independent monitoring also has a role in AFDC and CSE. An
American data protection commission could begin this task by exploring
the limits of the assumption shared by AFDC and CSE that the greater
the amount of personal information processed, the more successful these
programs will be in achieving their goals. 31 6 In one of his official reports,
Spiros Simitis, the former data protection commissioner of the German
state of Hesse, declared that administrative bodies should not seek to
maximize their collections of personal information, but should "only pro-
cess the personal data that is absolutely necessary. ' 317 There is a need to
reorient AFDC and CSE by having them determine not how much per-
sonal information they can obtain, but how little will allow them to carry
out their functions.
In addition to questioning these assumptions, independent monitor-
ing of AFDC and CSE should generate specific criticisms. In AFDC,
this process of constructive criticism should start by focusing on the way
312. See, eg., Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio
1990).
313. A parallel problem exists when wages are garnished for other purposes. See, e.g.,
Robert Laurence, North Dakota's New Rules Respecting Garnishment and the Property Exempt
Therefrom, 58 N.D. L. REv. 183, 207 (1982).
314. See supra text accompanying note 242.
315. Greeley, 551 N.E.2d at 986-87.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 177-180, 189.
317. DER HEssISCHE DATENSCHUTZBEAUFrRAGTE, SIEBZEHNTER T.TIGKEITSBERICHT
87 (1988) (translated from original).
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program applicants are overwhelmed by paperwork and documentation
requirements. 318 In CSE, a data protection commission should consider
ways to combat some employers' negative perception of noncustodial
parents whose wages are subject to withholding of child support. The
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement has already prepared a
model handbook for states to adopt and send to employers. 319 Yet these
handbooks do not appear to be convincing to all employers, and if a dif-
ferent message does not reach employers by 1994, when all noncustodial
parents will be subject to having child support payments withheld from
their salary, a large portion of the nation's work force may face reprisals.
A data protection commission might also consider whether limits
should be set on the CSEUs' sharing of personal data with commercial
credit bureaus. States vary in the amount of information shared and the
circumstances of this sharing.320 In light of the notorious ineffectiveness
of federal regulation of information practices at credit bureaus, 321 partic-
ular care is required when the government discloses personal information
to these entities. A CSEU should reveal to these bureaus only the exist-
ence of a government debt and not the nature of this debt. Although it is
not difficult to understand why the computer has been utilized to admin-
ister AFDC and CSE, the way that this machine is applied must be
improved.
Conclusion
This Article has described the emergence of governmental bureau-
cratic structures that process personal information and has examined the
application of computers in these bureaucracies to control human behav-
ior. Reliance on the data processing model of control is characteristic of
the state's service administration; it can lead, however, to a negative ef-
fect on bureaucratic justice and human autonomy. Intensive, detailed
knowledge of most aspects of human existence is now collected by com-
puterized data processing networks. Yet it is all but impossible to Imow
where this information will appear or for what purposes it will be used.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 159-180.
319. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., WAGE WITHHOLDING FOR CHILD SUPPORT: AN EMPLOYER'S GUIDE (1986).
320. See supra text accompanying note 252.
321. See EVAN HENDRICKS ET AL., YOUR RIGHT TO PRIVACY 134-35 (2d ed. 1990) (Fair
Credit Reporting Act has failed to place adequate controls over credit data to consumers);
Michael W. Miller, Hot Lists: Data Mills Delve Deep to Find Information about U.S. Consum-
ers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1991, at Al (credit bureaus, which "have access to sensitive finan-
cial information about virtually every American," aggressively sell data to marketing
companies).
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This danger adds new significance to a central challenge of represen-
tative democracy: managing governmental bureaucracy. The response
to this challenge should reflect closer attention to how administrative
agencies process personal data. In particular, an American data protec-
tion law should structure the government's use of data so as to contribute
to bureaucratic justice and the safeguarding of personal autonomy. Fur-
thermore, it should institute a review of this structure through an ongo-
ing evaluation of the risks of specific data processing systems.
This Article has argued that the pursuit of this goal should be
guided by three principles: The maintenance of transparent systems of
data processing, the assignment of limited procedural and substantive
rights to the data subject, and the establishment of independent monitor-
ing of data processing. These principles would supplant the purely in-
strumental reasoning of the data processing model with explicit attention
to goals other than technological perfection. By implementing these
principles, a compromise between exposure and concealment of informa-
tion may be developed in a way that protects bureaucratic justice and
autonomy. At present, however, American law neither implements these
principles nor strikes this compromise between data exposure and
concealment.
This Article has focused on the dangers of data processing as ap-
plied in programs with positive goals; even graver dangers may arise
when the state uses data processing to identify threats to national secur-
ity. The risk is not hypothetical: surveillance and repression are parts of
America's heritage.322 The American government has spied on and gath-
ered information about Nobel prize winners such as Thomas Mann,
poets such as Robert Lowell and Robert Frost, rock musicians such as
John Lennon, and at least one economist-John Kenneth Galbraith once
referred to his FBI file as "the most expensive research project that I
have ever been associated with. '323 If the American legal order cannot
protect against the dangers of the computer in such relatively noncontro-
versial settings as AFDC and CSE, it will never be able to establish a just
structure for the processing of personal information by federal agencies
322. See, e.g., MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL (1969) (describing destruction of
union, International Workers of the World (IWW), during post-World War I "Red Scare"
period in the United States); VON HOFFMAN, supra note 267, at 83-246 (McCarthy era).
323. MrrGANG, supra note 267, at 56, 128, 129, 191-95. See Educators Assail U.S. Curbs
on Access to Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 14, 1988, at B9 (FBI refuses to release government files
on John Lennon and argues that "even the explanation of how the material might jeopardize
national security would itself threaten national security.").
concerned with national security.324 Data protection law is a medium
through which Americans should guard against the encroachment-sub-
tle or obvious, slow or rapid-of their cherished liberties.
324. See, e.g., Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir.) (Sixth grader wrote 169 countries
with requests for information. International correspondence led to FBI surveillance and inves-
tigation of child. Patterson has been unable to gain access to all the governmental files about
him or to end the FBI's maintenance of records pertaining to his exercise of First Amendment
rights), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 48 (1990); JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 4 (1982)
(spying, including domestic surveillance, by National Security Agency, largely free from legal
control).
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Table A: Outside Data Sources Available to Arkansas
Department of Human Services (DHS) in
Administration of AFDC
1) Name of applicant and his SSN are sent to SSA to check validity of SSN.
2) SSA's BENDEX (Beneficiary Data System): This data base contains
information relating to Title II payments (Federal Old Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance Benefits) and Wage and Pension payments.
3) SSA's SDX: SSA sends magnetic tape once a week to Arkansas DHS. This
tape contains list of those eligible for Medicare and SSI payment data.
4) Internal Revenue Service:
a) tax interceptor program;
b) parent locator.
5) Arkansas Employment Security Division: Match of Worker's Compensation
and Employment Records.
6) Arkansas Child Support Enforcement Unit: Data sharing concerning
noncustodial parent's child support payment.
7) Internet: Exchange between states of unemployment information.
Table B: On-Line Access to Data of
Federal Parent Locator Service
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